The Evolution of the DPP and KMT’s Policies of the National Identity Issue

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Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui added drama to last year’s Taipei mayoral campaign when he asked the KMT nominee, Ma Ying-jeou, “Where is your homeplace?” Ma, a Mainlander, replied in broken Minnan dialect, ‘I’m a ‘New Taiwanese,’ eating Taiwanese rice and drinking Taiwanese water.’ Soon after, Ma won the mayorship with 51 percent of the vote.

With the 1998 campaign, the “New Taiwanese” concept finally hit its target. For years, Mainlander officials had sought to identify with the island; even the late president Chiang Ching-kuo once stated, “I’m Taiwanese, too.” But few native-born Taiwanese were willing to accept these claims; on the contrary, Mainlanders faced regular reminders of their identity as outsiders on Taiwan. But subtle political and demographic changes gradually opened the door to a more generous interpretation of ethnicity. First, as a generation of Mainlanders born or raised from early childhood on Taiwan reached maturity, distinctions between the two communities were far less apparent than they had been in previous generations. Second, resentment of Mainlanders, while not yet entirely absent, diminished significantly once the Mainland-born minority lost its monopoly on political power in the 1980s.

Indeed, President Lee’s promotion of a “New Taiwanese” identity is a clever strategic response to contemporary political and social trends. Lee’s counterpart in the mainstream opposition, former Democratic Progressive Party chair Hsu Hsin-liang, is promoting a similar concept, which he calls the Rising Nation (Xinxing Minzu). Both buzzwords reflect an emerging understanding of personal identity and national identity that encourages creative solutions to the problem of Taiwan’s status. Seeing identity in shades of gray has long been the norm among ordinary Taiwanese, but elites, both political and academic, long insisted on defining the national identity issue in black-and-white terms. As a result, political parties and social scientists only recently have recognized the extent to which Taiwanese are ready to embrace new identity concepts.

Elites, whether in Taiwan, Mainland China or the United States, tend to accept a dichotomous definition of Taiwan’s national identity. They believe the question of Taiwan’s status must be resolved, and that resolution must take the form either of political unification or of full independence. But this construction of the issue is problematic, however obvious it may seem on its face. Unlike elites, most ordinary Taiwanese do not desire a concrete resolution in these terms. For them, the ideal future is the present, the status quo. Their goal is not an end state, but a process, one that will allow Taiwan to continue to imagine itself as Chinese while continuing to enjoy political autonomy. Most Taiwanese prefer not to "resolve" the national identity issue at all, not only because they are afraid to challenge Mainland China, but also because their answer to the question "Do you prefer independence or unification?" is "no."

What we have come to call Taiwan’s "national identity question" has consumed countless hours of discussion and mountains of paper; it is a preoccupation of scholars, politicians and ordinary Taiwanese. But the way the national identity issue has been constructed in Taiwanese politics has forced on the Taiwanese people a false choice, a choice many refuse to make. Only

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1 Ma Ying-jeou was born in Hong Kong and raised in Taiwan by his mainland-born parents. Thus, in Taiwan parlance, he is a Mainlander, as opposed to a Taiwanese, which would imply that his family had been in Taiwan for several generations. Also, Ma was raised speaking Mandarin, not the Minnan dialect that distinguishes Taiwanese (other than Hakka and Aboriginal Taiwanese) from most Mainlanders.
3 Ibid., p. 8.
by abandoning polarized positions on the issue can the political parties forge strong links with Taiwanese society. The problematic nature of elite thinking on the issue is evident not only in the policy options offered by Taiwan's political parties, but also in the way social scientists operationalize the concept of national identity. In general, politicians and political scientists have defined an individual's position on the national identity issue as his or her preference for Taiwan independence or for unification with Mainland China. As a matter of fact, however, most Taiwanese do not prefer either of these outcomes, as survey after survey has shown. This leaves the majority of respondents in "residual" categories (prefer the status quo, no answer, don't know) which are rarely examined.

Within the last few years, this state of affairs has begun to change both in the political realm and among social scientists. The positions of Taiwan's two major political parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have begun to converge on a moderate approach to the national identity problem. While the parties continue to pay lip service to polarized positions (the KMT still calls for unification, while the DPP advocates independence), their concrete policy recommendations increasingly support the status quo: they would continue Taiwan's de facto autonomy, while eschewing a formalized declaration of independence. By doing so, the parties finally have brought their policies into line with the preferences of most voters. Social scientists, too, are beginning to deconstruct (or reconstruct) the concept of national identity. Liu I-chou's recent paper entitled "The Taiwan People's National Identity — a New Survey Method" (Liu 1998) is an important effort to "unpack" the national identity concept and make it more useful for analyzing public opinion across the spectrum. Liu's findings support the moderate policy direction the two major political parties have chosen.

Social Science and National Identity

Taiwanese scholars and political activists have constructed extremely sophisticated analyses of national identity. But operationalizing this concept as a measurable variable has proven difficult; most quantitative studies still define it in terms of a respondent's preference for independence or unification. There are far too many such studies to mention all of them. The following sample (which is, admittedly, unscientific and incomplete) is designed to illustrate both the growing sophistication of these studies and their long-standing reliance on the independence-unification dichotomy to measure "national identity," despite the fact that most Taiwanese do not prefer either of these options.

An early statement of the national identity question appeared in a 1984 survey conducted by scholars at the Academia Sinica's Institute of Ethnology. They asked respondents to agree or disagree with this statement: "Unifying China is more important than building Taiwan." (Ch'u 1993:151). In 1987, Chang Mao-kuei and Hsiao Hsin-huang introduced a survey question aimed at measuring ethnic identity. They asked respondents which of the following best captured their self-defined identity: Taiwanese; Chinese; Taiwanese first, then Chinese; Chinese first, then Taiwanese; or both Chinese and Taiwanese. This question represented a political and conceptual breakthrough, recognizing that an ROC citizen might entertain a subjective identity different from the one on his or her state-issued identity card.

These early studies reveal two dimensions of the concept of national identity. The first seeks the respondent's opinion on a policy issue: Should Taiwan emphasize unification more than developing Taiwan? The second seeks a subjective self-assessment, given the social context of the time. These questions approach the problem of national identity indirectly; neither asks for
a definition of the nation in which the respondent lives. This type of questioning — using self-identification and positions on policy issues as approximations of national identity — became the standard for surveys in the 1990s.

The 1990 version of the Institute of Ethnology study posed three questions on this topic. The first asked for the individual's self-identification (agree or disagree: I am Taiwanese, not Chinese), while the second posed the policy question (agree or disagree: Taiwan should break with China and become a new country). The third question was unusual, in that it addressed the concept of national identity directly. It asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement "Taiwan is part of China." (Ch’u 1991:133,135). Each of these questions posed an either-or choice without defining the options clearly. The self-identification question forced the respondent to identify as Taiwanese or Chinese; we now know that most Taiwanese believe they are both. Answers to the second question are ambiguous in that they might reflect a respondent's ideal preference, or his/her practical calculation of risks and benefits. And the third question does not differentiate between Taiwan as part of a Chinese nation, in the cultural and historical sense, and Taiwan as a sub-unit of a Chinese state.

In the early 1990s, political scientist Chu Yun-han explicitly combined these elements in his operationalization of the national identity concept, which he defined as a choice between "Chinese Unification or Chinese complex" and "Taiwan Independence or Taiwanese complex." He wrote, "Chinese complex refers to a value orientation which favors the ultimate unification of Taiwan with Mainland China and insists on the inseparability of Taiwan and China both politically and culturally. Taiwanese complex, on the other hand, favors a separate identity for Taiwan both politically and culturally" (Chu 1992:68). This formulation merged political identity, cultural identity and public policy, thereby allowing the independence-unification question to capture all the dimensions of national identity.

Wu Nai-teh adopted Chu’s approach in a 1993 paper on provincial origin, political support and national identity. He concluded that the best way to measure national identity was to ask for respondents' preference between independence and unification. Wu recognized that if pollsters simply asked whether respondents preferred independence or unification, practical considerations such as fear of PRC attack and concern about the economic costs of unification would cause some respondents to choose not their ideal outcome (which Wu defined as national identity), but what they believed to be the best realistic outcome. To avoid this distortion, Wu composed two questions: "(1) Some people say, 'If Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with the Chinese communists after declaring independence, then Taiwan should become independent and establish a new country.' Do you support this way of thinking? (2) Some people say, 'If Taiwan and the mainland were comparable in their economic, social and political conditions, then the two sides should be unified.' Do you support this way of thinking?" (Wu 1993:46).

Given these two questions, each of which could be answered three ways (support, no opinion, oppose), Wu's design allows for six different outcomes. Two of these outcomes, Wu argued, represent national identity: those who support independence and oppose unification have a Taiwanese identity, while those who support unification and oppose independence have a Chinese identity. Those who express support for both options, writes Wu, do not have a concept of national identity. Their preference changes in response to pragmatic considerations; therefore, they are practicing "national choice." Thus, Wu assumes that the only coherent ways to imagine Taiwan's identity are as a politically and culturally separate country or as part of a unified China. Once the pollster has wished away practical concerns, the respondent is free to choose his or her
true preference between those two options. Those who cannot do so lack a meaningful preference. But this assumption is problematic. Normatively, it is troubling to dismiss strong views (either support for both independence and unification or opposition to both) simply because they appear illogical to the survey designer. Empirically, the number of responses that fall into the residual categories is too large to be ignored comfortably. These responses together outnumber two of the three "useful" categories (Taiwan identity and national choice), while one residual category (oppose both independence and unification) outnumbers the Taiwan identity group. Wu's conceptual framework excluded more than a quarter of his respondents. To make matters worse, as the survey was repeated, the percentage of responses in the residual categories increased.

A 1994 study by Shyu Huo-yan makes a number of adjustments to Wu's survey design. Shyu adopted Wu's practice of operationalizing national identity as one's position on the independence-unification issue, and he used Wu's questions. He also added a dimension he called "Who is the self?" (ziwo shi shei?) and correlated this dimension with "national identity." He found that those who identify as "Taiwanese" are more likely to have a "Taiwan identity," that is, to support Taiwan independence. Shyu also gave more attention to those respondents whom Wu said lacked national identity. He re-labeled those who support both independence and unification as "pragmatists" or "speculators;" those who oppose both he called "conservatives." (Wu's later papers also use the "conservative" label [e.g. Wu 1996].) He argued that these two groups' responses reflect active and passive support for the status quo, respectively. He pointed out the rapid rise in these two groups, from 44.1% of those surveyed in December 1991 to 52.2% in July 1993. Shyu opined that growing support for the status quo, along with a strong increase in the percentage claiming a Taiwan identity (from 13.4% in 1991 to 17.0% in mid-1993), constituted an "identity crisis" (Shyu 1994: passim).

A 1996 paper by Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min drew a more explicit line separating ethnic (or provincial) identity from national identity. They continued to define the latter in terms of independence-unification, which they refer to as an ideological position from which other policy preferences (such as the name under which Taiwan should seek to re-enter the United Nations) emanate (Chu and Lin 1996:90). Ethnic identity they defined as a subjective psychological orientation. The questions they designed to tap these preferences are somewhat problematic. On the "national identity" question they ask simply, "Independence or unification, which is your favored future for Taiwan?" a question that allows respondents to choose based on practical considerations, rather than their perception of Taiwan's national identity. Likewise, the study uses this question to measure "ethnic identity:" "How should we call ourselves, the 20 million people living on Taiwan? Chinese? Taiwanese? Or both?" (Chu and Lin 1996:90) One could argue that this question is much closer to a measure of national identity (how the respondent defines the nation to which he/she belongs) than of individual ethnic identity, since it asks for an assessment of the status of all Taiwan residents.

The studies described up to this point belong to a school of national identity research that is sometimes referred to as the Tai Da (National Taiwan University) school. They measure national identity in terms of a choice between independence and unification, with additional questions layered on to increase the studies' complexity. A second approach, sometimes called the Zheng Da school, is identified with National Chengchi University. It also uses respondents’ preferences for unification or independence to measure national identity, but in these studies, respondents are asked

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4 In a 1997 paper, Shyu folds the remaining residual categories (those which include at least one "no opinion" response) into his typology.
to locate their preference on a continuum: "Which do you prefer: unification as soon as possible; status quo leading to unification; status quo for a time, then decide; status quo indefinitely; status quo leading to independence; Taiwan independence as soon as possible?" (National Chengchi University studies also have asked respondents to place their preferences on a scale from 1 [prefer independence] to 10 [prefer unification].)

The various components of national identity are teased apart more fully in a 1996 paper by Yu Ching-hsin based on data from National Chengchi University's 1995 post-election survey. Yu separated provincial origin, ethnic identity and national identity and found that each of these dimensions was substantially independent of the others. Asked for their provincial origin (shengji), 85.2% of respondents identified as Taiwanese, 14.8% as Mainlanders. But when asked for their ethnic identity, only 30.4% said they identified as Taiwanese, while 19.0% said they were Chinese and the majority — 50.6% — said they were both. On the national identity issue, Yu found 15.9% supporting independence, 29.4% in favor of unification, and 54.5% preferring the status quo (Yu 1996: Table 7). Chen Wen-chun’s study, also based on National Chengchi University data, found that while the “objective” measure of identity (father’s provincial origin) did not change much from 1991 to 1996, self-identification did. Those identifying as “Taiwanese” went from 16.5% to 33.1%, while those identifying as “Chinese” fell from 32.5% to 16.6%. (Chen 1997:18) Meanwhile, nearly half of the respondents in both surveys identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese. (Chen 1997:18) As these studies demonstrate, identities in Taiwan are too complex to be captured accurately on a one-dimensional scale.

Given this complexity, using the independence-unification preference as a measurement of national identity is problematic. By the mid-1990s, surveys consistently found that most respondents favored the status quo (see Table 1), but few studies made much effort to understand this group. As Chiang I-hua writes, "people who support 'maintaining the status quo' outnumber or tie the number of 'unification' and 'independence' supporters combined" (Chiang 1998:39). Chiang further argues that it is unwise to ignore or dismiss such a large group while lavishing attention on the minorities. Moreover, it is undemocratic of scholars (and politicians) to insist on a polarized understanding of Taiwan's national identity when a majority of Taiwanese reject that view. There are three ways to interpret the widespread preference for the status quo. Either the questions were phrased in such a way that the respondents could not answer with their true preferences, or the majority of Taiwanese lacked any sense of national identity, or preferring the status quo is a kind of national identity. Social scientists addressed the first possibility by adjusting their questions to eliminate "extraneous" considerations. When the number of status quo supporters remained high, they concluded that these individuals had no national identity or that their responses were incoherent.\(^5\) I would argue, however, that the third interpretation was correct: support for the status quo is a meaningful statement of national identity.

In this I agree with Chiang I-hua and Ho Szu-yin. According to Ho, "past experiences show that the binary structure really deprives the respondents of a very meaningful choice, i.e., the status quo.” (Ho 1998:2) Similarly, Chiang criticizes researchers who relegate status quo

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\(^5\) The National Chengchi University Election Studies actively pushes respondents toward unification or independence with follow-up questions. Depending upon their choice among the six categories enumerated above, they are asked follow-up questions calling attention to practical considerations. For example, if a respondent leaned toward unification, the researcher asked “If Taiwan and mainland China’s economic, social and political conditions were considerably different, would you support Taiwan’s reunification with mainland China?” In the 1996 study, this technique substantially decreased the percentage of respondents choosing the status quo; still, nearly 40% of respondents chose answers that included “status quo, or refused to respond. (Chen 1997:21).
supporters to null categories, arguing that they are influenced by their own preferences. Citing the works of numerous social scientists, Chiang writes:

> In the face of this vast number of pragmatists [status quo supporters], if the researchers themselves have a preference on the independence-unification issue, they often cannot resist hanging negative labels on them. For example, these respondents are "confused about identity" (if they contend that they are Taiwanese but do not dismiss the possibility of unification with China in the future), "realists" (if they support 'independence if we can protect Taiwan's security; unification if the conditions on the two sides are equalized’), "conservatives" (if they do not have an opinion about independence and unification, or oppose both in favor of preserving the status quo), or even "speculative realists” (Chiang 1998:40).

One important reason why many political scientists marginalize the status quo position is that this view is inconsistent with their own training, which emphasizes the importance of clearly-defined, undivided sovereignty in defining the state. They also tend to believe that the nation – as an ethnic, cultural and even biological entity – ought to be coterminous with the state. In this view, an individual whose understanding of the boundaries of the state is flexible and who is not concerned with sovereignty could not possibly possess a coherent notion of national identity.

This bias is present in Western scholarship as well as studies written in Taiwan and the PRC (see, for example, Wachman 1994). One exception is the British scholar Christopher Hughes, who recognizes the strong desire of many Taiwanese to maintain political autonomy while at the same time remaining within the Chinese economic and cultural world. Nonetheless, he argues that this preference is at odds with an international understanding (shared by the authorities in Beijing) that sovereignty is indivisible; thus, he implies, Taiwan’s status quo is unsustainable. He describes Taiwan’s current political direction as “post-nationalism,” a term he invented to capture the desire of many Taiwanese to resist the notion that state boundaries must be consistent with ethno-cultural identity. (Hughes 1997:128) But post-nationalism, however creative and practical it may be, will inevitably clash with reality: “Unfortunately, international society cannot boast a good record when it comes to dealing with conflicts between the sanctity of statehood and the principle of self-determination” (Hughes 1997:160). This pessimistic assessment may well be accurate; however, Taiwan’s political parties are embarked on a quest to beat the odds by finding survival space for Taiwan between the lines in the international rulebook. In doing so, they are looking for a way to accommodate the preferences of a strong plurality of Taiwanese voters.

Another innovation in the study of the national identity issue comes from Liu I-chou, a scholar at National Chengchi University. Liu's paper, "The Taiwan People’s National Identity — a New Survey Method,” provides empirical support for the claim that ordinary Taiwanese embrace a flexible, multi-dimensional understanding of national identity. Liu argues that national identity cannot be captured by a single question (are you for independence or unification?), but is best understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. In international law, a nation is defined as a territory in which a state exercises sovereign rule over a population. Liu questions survey respondents about each piece of this definition. He asks what territory "China" includes (mainland only, mainland and Taiwan, Taiwan only), whom "the Chinese people" (Zhongguoren) includes (mainland people and Taiwanese people, mainland people only,
Taiwanese people only), and who has sovereignty over Taiwan (that is, who has the right to decide Taiwan's future).

Liu finds that Taiwanese respondents' views do not cluster around a "Taiwan complex" and a "Chinese complex." On the contrary, they treat each of Liu's questions independently. A quarter of the respondents (26.7%) believed "China" included only the mainland, but less than half that number (10.7%) believed "the Chinese people" included only people on the mainland. Conversely, half (49.2%) believed that "China" included both Taiwan and the mainland, while 70.5% thought "the Chinese people" included both mainland and Taiwan residents (Liu 1998:8-9). If Liu's respondents appear sympathetic to a "Chinese" national identity at this point, his third question pulls in the opposite direction. Three-quarters (74.5%) of the respondents said Taiwan residents alone should have the right to decide Taiwan's future, while only 10.9% said the opinions of mainland Chinese should be considered (Liu 1998:10). In sum, when it comes to geographical identity, in which history plays an important role, Taiwanese are twice as likely to link themselves to the mainland as to assert a separate identity. And they are even more likely to view themselves as "Chinese," an ethnic and cultural category. But when it comes to politics, there is a strong consensus that Taiwan should be autonomous.

When Liu combines his three questions into a typology, he once again finds a wide distribution of opinion. The largest group (38.1%) includes those who believe that Taiwan is part of China, and Taiwanese are Chinese, but that Taiwan residents should decide their own future. The next largest group (21.8%) believes that Taiwan is not part of China, and Taiwanese are not Chinese, and Taiwan residents should decide their own future. The third largest group (14.5%) includes respondents whose views of geography and ethnicity are mixed, but who believe in the sovereignty of the Taiwanese people. The smallest group (7.6%) are those who identify with "Greater China," including Taiwan in China, Taiwanese in the Chinese people, and expressing a willingness to include Chinese in decision-making about Taiwan's future (Liu 1998:12). Here again, we can see that the only strong point of consensus is support for self-determination.

Liu's paper also allows us to evaluate the appropriateness of using independence-unification to measure national identity. Liu compares his respondents' identity type to their view of unification. Overall, half of the respondents (49.9%) preferred the status quo. In the "Greater China identity" group, 35.5% chose the status quo, compared to 45.5% for gradual unification and 7.4% for rapid unification; in the "Taiwan identity" group, 45.2% preferred the status quo, compared to 28.1% for gradual independence and 10.8% for rapid independence. In other words, even among respondents with a clear sense of national identity, support for the status quo was very strong.

Liu's findings call to mind an important insight in Wachman's work. Wachman concluded that "the real issue for those who promote independence may not be autonomy – which they have enjoyed under KMT rule – but sovereignty, Taiwanese sovereignty over Taiwan" (Wachman 1994:78). The autonomy Taiwan already enjoys satisfies many Taiwanese, but it is not enough for the independence activists, who fear that without the formal sovereignty of an independent state, Taiwan may someday lose its autonomy. Unfortunately for them, sovereignty is ultimately a matter of recognition by other nations; Taiwan cannot attain sovereignty on its own. Thus,

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6 Liu points out that this finding could reflect either principle (a conviction that the views of Chinese should not be ignored) or pragmatism (the belief that it would be impossible to ignore the mainland's position)
7 In this survey, which was conducted in January 1997 by National Chengchi University's Election Studies Center, respondents were offered the following choices: urgent independence, gradual independence, maintain status quo, gradual unification, urgent unification.
Wachman implies, unless the PRC and other countries undergo profound changes, Taiwan independence is a doomed proposition. (Hughes makes a similar argument point.)

This analysis makes sense with respect to advocates of formal independence. But Liu’s results demonstrate that for most Taiwanese, sovereignty is not a high priority; on the contrary, they are concerned primarily about preserving Taiwan’s autonomy. For the majority, a declaration of independence is both unnecessary and undesirable, since it would likely force a confrontation. Thus, for a majority, or at least a large plurality of Taiwanese, autonomy without sovereignty is the best possible outcome. Indeed, Liu found that even among those respondents who believe Taiwan possesses a distinct geographical and cultural identity, a plurality (45%) are content with autonomy (self-rule) alone. In sum, most Taiwanese are reluctant to repudiate the island’s historical and cultural connection to Mainland China, which is what the Taiwanese nationalist justification for independence requires. At the same time, however, they are strongly committed to political self-determination.

What this suggests for politicians is that the most popular policy prescription is to do whatever is required to preserve Taiwan’s autonomy. If improved relations with Beijing will ease cross-strait tensions and strengthen Taiwan’s autonomy, then most Taiwanese will support continued negotiations. If Beijing pushes too hard toward Taiwan’s annexation, a majority of Taiwanese could come to see independence as their best bet for preserving autonomy. (This helps explain why support for independence rose during the 1996 missile crisis, then declined as cross-strait tensions eased.) But the majority of Taiwanese still believe in an ancestral (ethnic) or cultural tie to the Chinese mainland. This emotional tug militates against a desire for formal independence, so long as Taiwan’s de facto political independence is preserved. This, then, is the backdrop against which Taiwan’s two main political parties, the KMT and the DPP, have acted out the protracted and painful struggle to define their own policies on the national identity question.

Party Politics and National Identity

Taiwan's political opposition did not set out to make independence the central issue in ROC politics. While many early opposition figures felt their Taiwanese identity acutely, their political platform was aimed at realizing the democratic promise of the ROC constitution, not overhauling the very definition of the state. The first DPP platform summarized the goals that had motivated the opposition throughout the 1970s and ‘80s: "...complete renewal of membership to the [Legislative Yuan and National Assembly] through elections; release of political prisoners; freedom of the press, freedom to establish new political parties, and freedom of assembly and demonstration; accelerated admission of native Taiwanese to positions of political power; popular election of the governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung...; repeal of the National Security Law [martial law]; and divestment of KMT business interests..." (Sutter 1988:48-49).

These objectives fell into two broad categories: political reform and ethnic justice. These two notions intersected in the demand for self-determination. To many conservatives, self-

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8 This situation will not necessarily last forever. As Wu Yu-shan and others have pointed out, Beijing’s episodes of threatening and bellicose behavior toward Taiwan are chipping away at Taiwan citizens’ feelings of identification with China.

9 The primacy of autonomy is apparent in Mainland Affairs Council surveys. Over the past two years, a consistent 70% of respondents have answered yes to this question: If developing foreign ties led to rising tension on cross-strait relations, would you agree with such an effort? (Mainland Affairs Council)
determination was a euphemism for Taiwan independence. However, not all opposition activists were guilty of this deception. Robert Sutter captured the range of opinion within the DPP well when he wrote, "For moderate members of the DPP, self-determination means greater political power for the majority of Taiwanese, to be accomplished by equitable campaigns, open elections, and divestment of KMT business interests. Other members of the DPP assert — at least implicitly — that the Taiwanese electorate would abandon the goal of reunification if given a choice. In this view, self-determination could be seen as a veiled call for Taiwan independence" (Sutter 1988:49).

Sutter's analysis of the DPP's founding platform reveals two important points. First, the DPP's eventual decision to advocate independence was not inevitable. Self-determination was a meaningful goal in itself; it was not merely a code word the party used to get around the laws against advocating independence. Second, many oppositionists believed that the KMT's treasured ambition of unifying Taiwan with Mainland China was not consistent with the will of Taiwan's majority. And if most Taiwanese did not support unification, the oppositionists assumed this meant they preferred independence. These beliefs were based on impressionistic experience, not data.

Academia Sinica's 1984 study found strong support for unification. Asked to agree or disagree with the statement "Unifying China is more important than building Taiwan," 57% of the respondents expressed agreement (22% strongly agreed, 18% agreed and 17% somewhat agreed). Only 14% expressed disagreement, compared to 29% who didn't know, had no opinion, or refused to answer (Ch'u 1993:151). Nor had the situation changed very much by 1990. In that year, three-quarters of the respondents told Academia Sinica researchers that Taiwan should not break with China and become a new country, and the same percentage agree with the statement "Taiwan is part of China" (Ch'u 1991:133,135). That same year, a study by Public Opinion Research Foundation found that 67 percent of Taiwanese disapproved of the Taiwan Independence Movement, while only 12.5 percent approved of it (Ma 1992:30). The independence advocates dismissed these results, claiming that respondents were afraid to express their true preference or were afflicted by false consciousness. In fact, however, no more than a third of respondents in any independent survey have ever expressed support for independence.

From the DPP's founding in 1986 until 1991, the party maintained an ambiguous stance on the national identity issue. This state of affairs echoed the deep rifts within the party, which was a coalition of anti-KMT forces from across the ideological spectrum. As Kuo Cheng-liang, a former DPP spokesman and political scientist puts it, the party was divided over whether to emphasize democratic procedures (the holding of a referendum on national identity) or substantive outcomes (Taiwan independence). This was a major source of division between the Formosa and New Tide factions (Kuo 1998:62). When questioned about the platform's self-determination plank in a 1989 interview with the Hong Kong magazine The Nineties, party spokesman Yu Ching refused to say whether it constituted an endorsement of Taiwan independence. Yu's refusal almost certainly revealed a desire to avoid exposing factional conflict. The DPP leadership included some well-known opponents of independence, including Huang Hsin-chieh, Chu Kao-cheng and Yu Teng-fa. According to The Nineties, the moderate "Formosa" faction "...emphasizes Taiwan residents' self-determination (namely deciding their future on their own), stresses political openness, and seeks a checks-and-balances government." The Progress faction, led by Lin Cheng-chieh, a Mainlander, opposed Taiwan independence. Meanwhile, the New Tide faction, under the leadership of Chiu Yi-jen and Wu Nai-jen, took a pro-independence position (JPRS-CAR-90-019, 8 March 1990:78).

The DPP's struggle intensified after the ROC government lifted martial law in 1987. Although independence advocacy remained illegal, the law was rarely enforced, and this
emboldened the DPP's radicals. The political reforms enacted between 1989 and 1992 — including lifting martial law, increasing the number of locally-elected national legislators, easing restrictions on the mass media and legalizing opposition parties — not only reduced the disincentives to openly advocate independence, but also gave the DPP strong incentives to do so. As Cheng and Hsu put it, "...After the KMT leadership promised a democratic transition in 1986 ... the issue of democratic reform gradually lost its political utility. For electoral mobilization, the DPP began to stress the issue of ethnic cleavage" (Cheng and Hsu 1996:145). This shift strengthened the party's pro-independence wing, which was comfortable with the rhetoric of Taiwanese nationalism.

In 1988, the DPP incorporated two new planks into its platform, stating: “Taiwan’s independent international sovereignty is not equivalent to the People’s Republic of China with Beijing as its capital” and “Any change in Taiwan’s international status must have the approval of all Taiwan residents” (Kuo 1998:65). On April 17, 1988, the DPP National Congress passed a resolution based on Chen Shui-bian’s “Four Hypotheticals,” stating ”Taiwan independence is one possible scheme for solving the Taiwan issue. The ruling party authorities should not forbid it...Should the Kuomintang and the Communists enter into one-sided peace talks, should the Kuomintang sell out the interests of the people of Taiwan, should the Chinese Communists unify Taiwan, and should the Kuomintang not institute genuinely democratic constitutional government, this party advocates independence for Taiwan” (JPRS-CAR-90-019, 8 March 1990, p. 81). This position, while more explicitly sympathetic to independence than the DPP's earlier platform, still fell short of endorsing Taiwan independence unconditionally. It did, however, introduce Taiwan Independence as an option, and it placed the responsibility for the DPP’s decision on the issue in the hands of the KMT and CCP (Kuo 1998:65).

Electoral results and public opinion surveys suggest that the DPP's ambiguous stance on the independence issue was in sync with the views of the general public. The share of votes captured by the DPP and its predecessor, the Tangwai, grew steadily throughout the 1970s and '80s [see figure 1]. According to surveys, the proportion of voters who approved of independence was small, under fifteen percent in most surveys. Nonetheless, some pro-independence candidates did well, in part because of structural factors. Under the ROC's system of single, non-transferable voting in multi-member districts (the SNTV system), candidates need only a small share of the vote to be elected (often less than 20 percent). The system gives candidates with small but dedicated followings a strong advantage.

Candidates who were willing to come out publicly for independence were in a good position to benefit from these conditions, and Beijing’s plummeting popularity after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 further emboldened them. That year, eight members of the New Tide faction joined together to form the pro-independence “New Nation Alliance” to contest seats in the December legislative election. All eight were elected, a stunning accomplishment. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this result as evidence of widespread support for independence among the electorate. In fact, pro-independence sentiment was rare, but intense. In a September 1990 interview, one of the New Nation Alliance's successful legislative candidates, Hsieh Chang-ting, told Hong Kong's Kuang Chiao Ching that he had won his 1989 race in spite of his affiliation with the Alliance. He did not deny supporting independence, but said he would not initiate such statements, either (JPRS-CAR-90-081, 55-62). Clearly, Hsieh preferred not to be pigeonholed as an independence zealot. After the New Nation Alliance's success, the DPP became more sympathetic to the independence cause, but it remained ambivalent.

The DPP stayed on the fence through 1990, stressing self-determination and opposition to forcible unification: "The DPP's position on Taiwan's future is the 'people's self-determination,' and
it maintains that all inhabitants should jointly determine their common destiny ... As Taiwan's largest opposition party, the DPP has the responsibility to reflect the aspirations of the masses of society, to vigorously try to obtain accelerated implementation of constitutional government reform, and to avoid Taiwan's losing its way in the abyss of unification” (JPRS-CAR-90-084, p. 73). At this point, even the New Tide faction recognized that there was far more political gain to be had in opposing unification than in advocating independence. As New Tide legislator Lu Hsiu-yi explained, ‘Ask the same person whether he accepts CPC [Communist Party of China] rule' and 'whether he advocates Taiwan independence,' and you may get some intriguing answers. Fearful that independence may lead to military threats from the CPC and profound change, the person may come out against Taiwan independence. But if it is phrased in terms of maintaining the status quo and resisting unification with or incorporation into Communist China, I believe the proportion of people who say yes will be very high. To the CPC, this is independent Taiwan, which has more support in Taiwan society than Taiwan independence. But what is independent Taiwan? What is Taiwan independence? There are many interpretations...” (JPRS-CAR-90-089, p. 73).

Lu Hsiu-yi distinguished between Taiwan Independence (Tai du) and an independent Taiwan (du Tai). He used this wording to keep his position deliberately vague; the only option for which Lu expressed clear support is the status quo. But others in the New Tide faction were losing patience with the status quo and with the DPP's waffling. In April, New Tide leader Lin Cho-shui called for a new constitution in which the ROC would be reconstituted as an independent state. Throughout the summer, a battle raged in the Legislative Yuan over the retirement of veteran legislators. The conflict had a strong ethnic dimension; the speaker of the Legislative Yuan accused his opponents of anti-Mainlander prejudice. This politicization of ethnicity helped warm up the New Tide faction's rhetoric. When the National Affairs Conference that summer failed to address the national identity issue, the New Tide faction grew hotter still. New Tide attempted to clarify the issue with a resolution stating that “Taiwan’s sovereignty does not include Mainland China and Outer Mongolia.” This position was too strong for moderates in the DPP, but Hsieh Chang-t'ing offered a successful compromise. His Resolution 1007 stated, “Our country’s effective sovereignty does not include Mainland China and Outer Mongolia. Our future constitutional system, domestic politics and foreign policy should be based on the scope of our effective territorial boundaries.” Hsieh’s version rejected the ROC’s traditional self-definition, but the use of the term “effective sovereignty” blunted its impact.

In 1991, the New Tide faction moved decisively to put the national identity issue, which it understood as a struggle between unification and independence, at center stage. The faction proposed that the DPP amend its platform and charter to include support for “founding a sovereign, independent and self-governing Republic of Taiwan” (quoted in Kuo 1998:68). The proposal put the party's other factions, especially the large and powerful Formosa faction, in a difficult position. The change might well repel more voters than it would attract, but a New Tide walkout would weaken the DPP severely. The New Tide faction mobilized the DPP's most zealous and committed supporters, not only as voters, but also as volunteers and financial contributors. Not only was New Tide the best-organized element within the DPP; but also, the KMT was sure to exploit a split in the DPP to rebuild its own sagging popularity. In the end, the Formosa faction leaders agreed to an amended version of the pro-independence plank in exchange for the New Tide's promise to accept two more years under a Formosa faction party chair. The amended version established a referendum as the appropriate method for carrying out Taiwan Independence.11 Sadly, the party's decision drove

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11 The official English text of this plank reads: “Taiwan has enjoyed de-facto separation and independence from China for 100 years. Its political and economic achievements amply demonstrate that Taiwan fulfills all the criteria for a sovereign
its remaining anti-independence leaders out of the party, including the DPP's highest-ranking Mainlander, Lin Cheng-chieh.

Enshrining Taiwan independence in the party platform carried a risk, but the Formosa faction leadership decided it was worthwhile. With political reform advancing steadily under KMT leadership, the DPP needed new issues to entice the voters. If independence turned out to be as popular as the New Tide asserted, the party would gain from the move. If the new platform bombed at the ballot box, New Tide would be forced to ease off on the issue. In essence, the DPP told the independence zealots to sink or swim.

As it turned out, making independence the centerpiece of its 1991 National Assembly campaign had disastrous results for the DPP. The KMT leapt onto the offensive, trotting out decades of threatening statements from Beijing to prove the DPP's irresponsibility and recklessness. Even before the campaign was over, some DPP candidates began retreating from their own party's platform. When the votes were counted, the opposition had suffered the worst setback in its history. DPP candidates won only 24 percent of the vote, the party's lowest share since the 1986 National Assembly race. A post-election poll reflected the gap between the opposition party and the voters: As it turned out, making independence the centerpiece of its 1991 National Assembly campaign had disastrous results for the DPP. The KMT leapt onto the offensive, trotting out decades of threatening statements from Beijing to prove the DPP's irresponsibility and recklessness. Even before the campaign was over, some DPP candidates began retreating from their own party's platform. When the votes were counted, the opposition had suffered the worst setback in its history. DPP candidates won only 24 percent of the vote, the party's lowest share since the 1986 National Assembly race. A post-election poll reflected the gap between the opposition party and the voters: As it turned out, making independence the centerpiece of its 1991 National Assembly campaign had disastrous results for the DPP. The KMT leapt onto the offensive, trotting out decades of threatening statements from Beijing to prove the DPP's irresponsibility and recklessness. Even before the campaign was over, some DPP candidates began retreating from their own party's platform. When the votes were counted, the opposition had suffered the worst setback in its history. DPP candidates won only 24 percent of the vote, the party's lowest share since the 1986 National Assembly race. A post-election poll reflected the gap between the opposition party and the voters: 

Asked to agree or disagree with the statement "If Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with the Chinese communists after declaring independence, then Taiwan should become independent and establish a new country," 42 percent disagreed, while 57 percent agreed that, "If Taiwan and the mainland were comparable in their economic, social and political conditions, then the two sides should be unified" (Shyu 1994:6). While other factors contributed to the DPP's poor performance, the independence platform was extremely damaging.

The 1991 National Assembly election was a turning point. The failure of the independence experiment damaged the New Tide faction's credibility and opened the door for the DPP to take a more moderate approach. The party did not remove the independence plank from its platform, but it no longer emphasized immediate independence in its rhetoric and policy proposals. "Finally, except for a few zealot [sic], most DPP leaders conceded after the defeat in the 1991 National Assembly election that it is impossible for the DPP to build up a winning electoral majority on the issue of national identity. On the contrary, the DPP might become [a] captive of its uncompromising position on national identity and lock itself into a permanent opposition" (Lin, Chu and Hinich 1995:9). The national identity issue was a hit with the party's core constituency and had a strong ideological appeal for party stalwarts, but it was not a winning issue with the general public.

If the independence plank was a blunt instrument, after the 1991 election the DPP set about crafting policy positions that better reflected the subtleties of public opinion. Taiwanese were nervous about independence (although the proportion who agreed with independence if good relations with the mainland could be maintained exceeded those who disagreed by a margin of 36.6 percent to 35.8 percent in January of 1993), but they also feared the isolation imposed on Taiwan by Beijing's aggressive foreign policy. In response, the DPP began pushing hard for Taiwan to return to the United Nations. This position proved extremely popular with voters, and it split the ruling party. President Lee Teng-hui sought to balance factions within the KMT by keeping his pragmatic diplomacy moving forward in synch with progress in cross-straits state under international law. Taiwan deserves the right to participate fully in the international community. The DPP advocates holding a referendum to determine whether Taiwan is a part of China. Central to the DPP policy is that the sovereignty of the island belongs to the Taiwanese people alone. As such, the DPP opposes any internationally-recognized "One China Policy" where Taiwan is a part of China” (DPP webpage, http://www.dpp.org.tw/english/index.htm, February 24, 1999).
relations. The pressure for a UN bid destabilized this balance in favor of pragmatic diplomacy. As the 1992 legislative election approached the DPP not only pressed the United Nations bid, but also attacked KMT corruption and campaign finance abuses. These new issues were a success with voters; the DPP's 36 percent vote share was consistent with the pattern of steady improvement it had enjoyed in previous legislative elections.

Since the 1991 fiasco the DPP never again has articulated its position on the national identity issue in such raw terms. In the 1993 White Paper on the DPP's ethnic and cultural policy, Chang Mao-kuei wrote that the party should, "Seek a nationalism with a founding spirit, and on this foundation develop a healthy, modern citizen consciousness, build a pluralistic and egalitarian society and build a new, modernized country" (Quoted in Chiang 1998:14). While Chang's call for nation building implies some form of Taiwan independence, it is a subtle form, and one that might be satisfied with political autonomy. In a November 1993 interview, Hsu Hsin-liang called the safety of Taiwan's residents the DPP's top priority. He also said the DPP would not unilaterally declare independence, but would base its decisions on objective international conditions (Kuo 1998: 72). At the same time, the DPP was easing away from its relentless criticism of cross-straits negotiations. As Steven Goldstein put it, "The DPP had previously maintained a negative stance regarding relations with the mainland. Increasing business relations were seen as weakening Taiwan's potential for independence, while greater 'unofficial' contact was viewed as a prelude to party-to-party talks aimed at eventual unification and thus betrayal of Taiwan. However, growing economic relations with the mainland and the concern of small Taiwanese businesses (that constituted the bulk of the DPP's support) about investment conditions there meant that the party's response to the mainland could not continue to be simply negative" (Goldstein 1997:7).

During the years in which the DPP was groping toward a workable position on the national identity issue the KMT's stance was much more rigid. Its history and ideology prevented the ruling party from retreating from its pro-unification policy. Nonetheless, President Lee Teng-hui found room to maneuver within that framework to bring the KMT position more in line with the status quo, as the public preferred. For example, in 1991 the ruling party dropped its long-standing insistence that the Republic of China government was the sole legitimate authority in all of China. It acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Beijing government over the mainland area and dropped the state of war between the two sides. But additional steps to accommodate the growing popular support for policies aimed at preserving the status quo ran into strong resistance from conservatives within the KMT.

T.J. Cheng and Yung-ming Hsu have argued persuasively that the New Tide faction's successful campaign to make independence versus unification the central issue in ROC politics drove a wedge into the KMT that ultimately split the ruling party. Members of the New KMT Alliance pressed the leadership to take a stronger line in favor of unification and against the DPP's open independence advocacy. But President Lee's Mainstream faction, fearing a political backlash if it were to crack down on the opposition, took a mild line. After the 1992 election, DPP legislators worked with members of the Mainstream faction to unseat the conservative premier, Hau Pei-tsun. Shortly thereafter, members of the New KMT Alliance left the ruling party to found the New Party. With these two obstacles out of the way, the Mainstream faction was free to moderate its position on the national identity question even further. The party began to advocate a "two Chinas" or "divided nation" model. By 1993, President Lee, "had been forced [by domestic pressure] towards a centrist position on the mainland issue which favors status quo
even as it seeks to mollify those advocating independence and those calling for unification" (Goldstein 1997:13).

The DPP experienced a similar liberation in 1996 when pro-independence extremists quit the party to form the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP). The immediate cause of their departure was the DPP's decision to cooperate with the New Party in legislative maneuvers; its underlying cause was the DPP's increasing moderation on the national identity issue. As Lin, Chu and Higley put it, "...while its formal position on the question of the future of Taiwan is in stark contrast with the KMT's official stance for unification, the DPP found an increasing convergence of its mainland policy and foreign policy proposals with that of the KMT mainstream faction" (Lin et.al., 1995:9). Once the radicals had exited the DPP, the leadership was free to take the party closer to the political center where most Taiwanese voters were located.

Even before the TAIP's departure, some DPP leaders were adopting a new approach. Both major factions responded to the party's faltering electoral progress and weakening overseas support by shifting their rhetoric away from a nationalistic movement for formal independence and toward a position emphasizing the protection of Taiwan under its current conditions of sovereignty. In September of 1995, the DPP party chair, Shih Ming-teh, told an audience in Washington, D.C. “If the DPP comes to power, we will not need to declare Taiwan independence; nor will we do so” (Minjindang ruguo zhizheng, bubi ye buhui xunbu Taiwanduli) (quoted in Kuo 1998:72). According to Kuo, this development reflected the increasingly frosty reception independence was receiving in Washington and the DPP’s disappointing showing in 1994’s provincial and municipal elections. Shih’s new approach constituted, Kuo argues, a paradigm shift from “build an independent nation” (duli jianguo) to “renovate and protect Taiwan” (gexin baoTai). He writes, “It is unnecessary to declare Taiwan independence’ represented a new understanding of Taiwan’s status, arguing that Taiwan was already independent and that Taiwan need only preserve the existing international situation in order to maintain its sovereignty and independence” (Kuo 1998:73). Even the staunchly pro-independence New Tide faction has moderated its position in line with Shih’s approach. New Tide leader Lin Cho-shui responded with his own slogan, “In sovereignty, we already are independent, but we have yet to build a nation” (zhuquan yijing duli, jianguo xiang wei chenggong). In theory, these rhetorical changes transformed the DPP from the “independence party” to the “party of the status quo.” Unfortunately, asserting that new stance has proven far easier than communicating the new position to its various audiences. Neither the DPP’s domestic audience nor its antagonists in Beijing have offered much acknowledgement of the DPP’s new position.

Events in 1996 intensified the pressure on the DPP to move toward the center. Beijing's hamfisted efforts to intimidate Taiwanese voters turned the presidential election into a referendum on Lee Teng-hui's performance, especially his mainland policy. The results were overwhelmingly in his favor. In a field of four candidates, Lee won 54 percent of the vote. His closest challenger, the DPP's Peng Ming-min, received less than half as many. The crisis also convinced many DPP leaders to take PRC threats more seriously: "... an expected consequence of the recent showdown in the Taiwan Strait was the convergence of the DPP's reading of the island's structural constraints and realm of possibilities with that of the KMT. A growing number of DPP leaders have recognized that there is no realistic chance for Taiwan pursuing de jure independence in the foreseeable future" (Chu 1997:13).

The missile crisis affected the KMT and New Party as well as the DPP. "To the elites, it became apparent that a push toward independence would clearly risk war with China. They also
realized, on the other hand, that reunification with a bullying China had lost whatever appeal it once had among voters. At base, the crisis made it urgent for elites to seek a way out of the national identity impasse, something which had eluded the NAC [National Affairs Conference] but was crucial if Taiwan was to become a stable democracy” (Higley et.al. 1998:156). In response, leaders of all three parties agreed to participate in another national summit, the National Development Conference of 1996. The resulting agreement gave opposition parties a voice in mainland policy making, de-emphasized the UN bid and placed Taiwan's security ahead of cross-strait ties.

Since 1996, the similarities in the parties' positions have come to the fore, while within the DPP, approaches to the national identity issue are proliferating. In February 1998 the DPP held a symposium to work out a consensus approach to the issue of relations with Mainland China. Over the course of the three-day gathering, the DPP's major factions laid out their positions on key cross-strait debates. The Formosa faction argued for deeper economic engagement with the People's Republic of China, arguing the logic of interdependence: the best way to avoid forcible "annexation" is to engage mainland China in business dealings and imbed Taiwan in international economic institutions. Formosa faction leaders insisted that direct postal, trade and transportation links across the Taiwan Strait would allow Taiwan to serve as a bridge between China and the world, which in turn would give both Chinese and foreign firms incentives to discourage PRC aggression. The New Tide faction followed a Realist framework, arguing that economic nationalism remains the dominant international paradigm. Interdependence will not protect Taiwan. Instead, New Tide leaders argued, Taiwan needs to protect itself through economic growth and diplomatic outreach. New Tide supported cautious dialogue with PRC, but opposed the Formosa faction's "advance westward" slogan. All the factions agreed that Taiwan is currently independent and sovereign, but they de-emphasized this point in their final policy accord. First, practically speaking, the sovereignty issue is a dead-end because the PRC refuses to discuss it. Second, the DPP's current position is that because Taiwan already enjoys de facto independence, a declaration of de jure independence is unnecessary, and would only antagonize Beijing.

Just as the DPP has relinquished its dream of declaring formal independence, the KMT has become far more restrained in its pursuit of unification. Even Straits Exchange Foundation head Koo Chen-fu, the man charged with negotiating the conditions for unification, is cautious. In a May 1998 speech in Washington, Koo said, "Precisely because the opposite sides have evolved into two totally different societies, it will require a complete process to lay the foundation for unification." In a comment that reflects public opinion with almost scientific accuracy, Koo added "... there are no divisions of an ethnic or cultural nature that separate Taiwan from the mainland. Nearly five decades of divided rule, however, has helped to create two totally different polities and social systems" (Free China Journal, June 12, 1998, p. 7).

Conclusion

Defining national identity as a preference for independence or for unification is a long-standing habit of politicians and scholars. The strong preferences most of these individuals have for one or the other induces them to see the issue in black and white terms. For its part, Beijing reinforces this tendency by insisting that any deviation from its own formula for unification constitutes a move toward independence. But ordinary Taiwanese – the people to whom Taiwan’s leaders ultimately are accountable – see national identity in shades of gray. For most Taiwanese, admitting that their island is part of China in a historical and cultural sense is not the same as accepting a “one country, two systems” formula for unification. They agree with Koo
Chen-fu: the ethnic and cultural gap between Taiwan and Mainland China is not insurmountable, but the two sides have totally different political and social systems. Support for the status quo reflects a desire to preserve this state of affairs, to keep Taiwan's political autonomy without giving up its cultural ties with the Mainland. Preserving the status quo is not tantamount to independence, because one aspect of the status quo is the dream that Taiwan and the Mainland have a special relationship that might someday, under just the right conditions, lead to some form of unification.

Taiwan's political parties learned in the early 1990s that the independence-unification dichotomy was not the right issue to move Taiwan's voters. The DPP learned this lesson when its pro-independence platform in the 1991 National Assembly election helped bring about its worst defeat in years. Tensions within the KMT over how fast and how far it could go toward unification without inviting a backlash from the voters finally split the party in 1993. Since then, both parties have moved steadily toward the center, toward the status quo, toward the position embraced by the majority of Taiwanese. T. J. Cheng predicted this result in 1993 when he wrote, "Consensus should and could emerge from public debates, leading to a gradual convergence of preference among an overwhelming majority of people ... Democracy also mitigates conflict between the extreme and irreconcilable political advocacies of the DPP and proactive unificationists by providing them with a political market to periodically test their 'products'" (Cheng 1993:7). Finding new products to sell in Taiwan's political market will be difficult, but the political parties may well find that the sophisticated understanding of public opinion offered by Liu I-chou and other scholars will ease their way.
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Mainland Affairs Council and UDN polls, 1991-1995

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Source: Tse-kang Leng, *The Taiwan-China Connection*, p. 50
Figure 1:


% of Vote