China's Self-Image and Strategic Intentions:
National Confidence and Political Insecurity

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How does China view itself after two decades of phenomenal growth and changes? What are the security concerns and likely demands of the increasingly powerful PRC? To address these questions, this paper aims at an analysis of China's strategic intentions by examining China's self-image.¹ Perhaps as a reflection of the speed and depth of the great changes and the immense potential and uncertainties the nation has been experiencing, China has a self-image that is filled with contradictions. An increased self-confidence of the Chinese nation and a peculiar but persisting sense of insecurity of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) leadership have deeply colored China's strategic considerations. Likely to be more assertive and even nationally demanding, the PRC, under the current political regime, appears to prefer a conservative foreign policy for the sake of its political stability. Ironically perhaps, the more capabilities the PRC develops and the bigger role Beijing plays internationally, the more acute the sense of CCP's political insecurity is likely to become and thus the even stronger the restraining effect of such a mentality on China's foreign policy.
Increasingly confident and self-assured, China is now rightfully feeling safe as a nation. Many of its people believe that a rejuvenation of Chinese civilization is approaching. Despite the noticeable nationalist sentiment, aspirations, and even ambitions, common to a rising power, China appears to have accepted two basic facts of today's international relations: First, the world is organized in a nation-state political system and an international market economy, rather than anything like the "Chinese world" order of the Middle Kingdom; Second, China is still clearly a backward or developing nation that lacks the capital and technology to qualify itself to be an equal to the West. Thus, not only the self evaluation of the Chinese capabilities but also the intended purpose assigned to that capabilities have been limited. More important, the PRC government in Beijing has demonstrated a profound concern bordering on a strong sense of under siege and insecurity, primarily caused by the political trepidation of the CCP leadership. The debilitating impact of such a mentality may have effectively constrained the foreign policy of a rising Chinese power. With a general sense of national security, a peculiar leadership mentality of under siege, and the limited and rather transparent external demands centered around the political survival of the CCP regime and the unification course, China's self image and strategic intentions are likely to sustain a conservative and pragmatic foreign policy for the PRC in the near future.

Capabilities and New Confidence

The rising capacity of the PRC has been widely analyzed. International financial organizations such as the World Bank the International Monetary Fund and the Chinese Government has similarly concluded that China's GDP (gross domestic product) grew at an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 1997 (11.8 percent in 1994) while the average world annual rate of economic growth was only 3.3 percent (2.5 percent for the developed nations and 5 percent for the developing nations). Eliminating the inflation factor, the Chinese GDP increased nearly four-fold in 15 years and is now seventh largest
in the world.\textsuperscript{2} Internationally, China rose from the 27th ranking trader in 1978 to be the 10th in 1998 (not including the 9th ranking Hong Kong which was returned to the PRC in 1997). China has accumulated the largest reserve of foreign currency after only Japan ($139 billion by 1998 comparing to only $167 million in 1978). Since 1992, the PRC has been the second largest recipient of foreign investment after the United States. China has become the fifth largest foreign holder of US Treasury Bonds ($43 billion by 1997) and the largest foreign buyer of T-Bonds in 1996.\textsuperscript{3}

Under Zhu Rongji's able leadership, the worrisome overheating of the economy appears to have eased considerably as the official inflation rate reduced from 16.7 percent in 1995 to less than 7 percent in 1996.\textsuperscript{4} This has given Beijing a great confidence that it still controls and is able to manage the Chinese economy. Consequently, the CCP leadership declared at the 15th CCP National Congress in the Fall of 1997, that an accelerated market-oriented reform of the money-losing state-owned enterprises is now on the agenda.\textsuperscript{5} The financial crises of 1997-98 in Southeast Asia and Korea have yet to significantly affect the Chinese economy and especially its export.

Given the massive population and thus huge domestic market, a still very cheap labor force of nearly 800 million, one of the largest natural endowments in the world, and the rapidly advancing market institutions, the high economic growth of the PRC is expected to continue into the 21st century to produce a world-class continental power. External forces could make a major difference especially applied as a cohesive and effective effort like the containment effort led by the United States during the Cold War. Yet a containment aimed at curbing the Chinese growth or limiting the Chinese power appears to be unfeasible. Chinese analysts have generally dismissed the possibility of a new Cold War type of containment against China.\textsuperscript{6} One senior analyst concluded internally in 1997:

The bi-partisan mainstream of the United States has realized that the rise of china is hard to stop and cannot be ignored; it is unfeasible to contain China, it must use engagement as
the means and 'incorporation' as the end; only that way, it can serve the U.S. own political, security, and economic interests.

The United States needs engagement policies as the channels of keeping 'Westernizing' and 'dividing' (xihua and fenghua) China. From a long-term perspective, the strategic objectives of the U.S. China policy is, through a trinity-policy of 'economic participation, political pressures, and ideological infiltration,' to lure and force the Chinese to gradually change its domestic and foreign policies and eventually to incorporate China into an international system dominated by the West. For that, the U.S. government must keep engaging China and avoid confrontation.7

The widely-held optimistic forecast of the rising Chinese power based on the high economic growth has often been presented in China as an echo to such estimates made by foreign observers. One analyst in Beijing reported that "more and more Westerners have viewed it to be final that China has become a world-class power."8 Such an "universal" feeling has substantially enhanced China's self image by the late 1990s. Accordingly, talks about more and larger Chinese role in international affairs emerge. Clearly, one sees a rise of confidence among the Chinese elites who generally have a deep sense of history and often a strong feeling of mission. One economist, noted for his independent analysis of the Chinese national capabilities, concluded that the current era has been China's "greatest era of reform and most prosperous era of construction" in history. Furthermore, after the U.S. and Japan, China has now been granted "the third rare historical opportunity in 100 years" to have an economic take-off into the status of a world economic power.9

A book by a group of scholars and analysts, prefaced by a long-time close associate of Jiang Zemin's, asserts that China has had a "Chinese miracle" of economic development, a "structural transformation" of its society, and a "polyarchical configuration" of its culture and ideology.10 "Rapidly growing Chinese economy will inevitably become the locomotive of the world's economy in the 21st century." Thus,
A rising China will never be a nation that is satisfied with only food and shelter. Her development and progress will definitely make increasing contributions to peace and prosperity of the world. China was such a [nation] in the past for several thousands of years, it will definitely become such a nation again in the next millennium.

Our nation used to be a crucial player on the playground of international politics. [Its] enhancing economic capabilities, and its status of being a major nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, will give our nation a larger and larger role in world affairs. (O)ur nation enjoys a position as an irreplaceable major world power.¹¹

Other analysts who are more ideologically-oriented believe that China is not only carrying the mission of rejuvenating the Chinese civilization and restoring its past glory, but also the grand task of safeguarding and promoting socialism that requires patience and hard working. One faculty member of the CCP's Central Party School summarized Deng Xiaoping's "strategic thoughts" as "so long as China's socialism does not collapse, socialism will forever stay in the world. If by the middle of the next century, China develops to be a mid-level developed country and realize its development strategy, socialism will become invincible."¹²

In short, many in Beijing believe that:

It is impossible that China will lie there motionless forever (as Napoleon allegedly suggested almost two hundred years ago). The 1.2 billion Chinese people, who are their own masters, want to develop and move on. This is a historical trend that nobody can hold back.¹³

_Cautions and Doubts_

Due cautions, however, must be exercised when assessing China's capabilities. Despite the seemingly high trade surplus the PRC currently enjoys, its economy is still basically a low-tech one. "China's leading exports are products that have not been pro-
duced in large quantity by American factories for more than a decade." In many important aspects, China still remains to be a developing country that has a large number of poor people and mounting economic, social, and political problems. Between the goals of a strong state and a rich people, the Chinese still are from being able to achieve both. Militarily, China is still a very modest power and it simply cannot purchase a modern military might from abroad with its limited military budget. Furthermore, "analysts need to provide more evidence that demonstrates whether China's PLA (People's Liberation Army) is catching up, merely keeping pace with, or perhaps falling behind" the existing major powers. Chinese elites are clearly aware of China's lack of power projecting capabilities, especially beyond its immediate neighborhood.

Checks to the growth of the Chinese power are visible, although none of them has appeared to be fundamentally undermining. A rising individualism and consumerism, the inevitable products of a market economy, are likely to reduce the resources available to the state's foreign ventures. The already happened political and economic decentralization may cut into deeply Beijing's ability of utilizing the PRC resources. Obstacles and potential hazards to the economic development are abundant. Compared to the world average, for example, China's per capita arable land, water, mineral and energy deposits are poor. "Frankly speaking," even to feed the Chinese has become a serious challenge that is viewed by analysts as being currently under "very great pressure." Cautious estimates about the Chinese economy are plenty in the Chinese press and academic writings. The current reform of the state-owned enterprises and the chronic issue of massive rural underemployment, compounded by the now increased competition from the Southeast Asian economies on the international market, have prompted many to develop conservative forecasts about the future of the Chinese economy.

The concerns and reservations are well reflected in the Chinese self assessment. The CCP leadership has been insisting that it needs at least another fifty years (from the mid-1990s) to turn China into a "middle-level developed" country. Scholarly discussion of
the "national conditions" of China is often filled with deep and often well-grounded concerns over some of the monumental problems China is facing: huge population that still grows by over ten million every year; hundred of millions of low- or un-skilled laborers needing jobs; the chronic problem of state enterprises; and the decline of both political legitimacy and governing authority of Beijing in a nation that is rich of regionalist traditions and is developing very unevenly. It is remarkable to notice that Chinese analysts often tend to be less optimistic than their Western counterparts in assessing the rise of Chinese power. The Western "inaccuracies" in estimating the Chinese power and its impact, explained some Chinese analysts, were caused by the Western analysts' "epistemological limits" or their "evil intentions" of manipulating the world opinion and hurting China.18

The previously quoted Chinese economist believes that there are at least four serious challenges to China's ascendance to a world economic power: the conflicts between the central government and local governments, the increasing gap between the developed areas and the less developed areas, the worsened relationship between the CCP/PRC government and the people, and the problems of economic instability. And there are unspecified "political risks that cannot be ignored."19 Others acknowledged in 1997 that there was a "hard to ignore belief crisis and social problems," and a possible "Yugoslavia-nization" of the PRC.20 Yet another group of scholars close to the CCP leadership listed as many as twenty-seven "key" issues, centered around the decline of central political and fiscal authorities, that need to be properly addressed in China today.21 In the view of many Chinese elites, the very promising future of the PRC, therefore, is not guaranteed. The "next 15-20 years," have been concluded to be "the most critical historical moment for the rise/success or fall/failure of this ancient civilization in the East."22

The rising Chinese national power is believed to have three features: massive aggregation of the power elements and great potential; low per capita resource and thus
small power projection capability; and "poor quality and low efficiency." Overall, China's "comprehensive national power" is ranked roughly the same as Japan (behind U.S. and Russia) and only a "regional power" in East Asia. There is a recognition of the significant gap between China's perceived or potential role and its acquired capabilities. China has thus basically viewed itself as "a regional, or trans-regional, major power with glistening global color," or "a quasi global power" with regional capabilities and rooms of maneuver.

As China is now more closely scrutinized by the existing major powers and aspires to be more active in international affairs, the self-recognition of the gap between a "major power" role and China's deficiency of capabilities is likely to be even more apparent.

**Values and Norms: How Different are the Chinese?**

Many, especially the realists, believe that the power position of the nations fundamentally condition and even determine their options and actions in international relations. A nation experiencing significant power increase will necessarily make new demands, search for new policies, and initiate new activities. Driven by its national objectives and found constrained by external conditions and especially the existing major powers, a rising power has a great propensity to demonstrate a challenging attitude, an aggressive involvement, and even an imperialist agenda. History has plenty of such examples. From the rise of Great Britain, the United States, to that of Germany, Japan, and the former Soviet Union, a rising power always led to the change of international relations that were often war prone, costly, and bloody. Yet, just a look at the different consequences of the rises of Germany/Japan and the United States may reveal that the inevitable accommodation of a rising power does not have to be exactly costly and destructive. The cause of the differences, it seems, is the different intentions of the rising power in question and the different international responses. The key variables here seem to be the different norms and values a rising power may have versus the existing major powers. If there are a
reasonably similar norms and values between the rising power and the existing major powers, a peaceful incorporation and a rapid and smooth integration into the existing international framework is more likely. If, however, a rising power is dominated by a strong and aggressive agenda which demands a major change and even overhaul of the existing international order, it may force the existing major powers into either a prolonged and costly cold war of containment, a bloody and often uncertain real war to settle the disputes, or a surrender that is normally out of the question.

Under international political anarchy or the nation-state system, nations, by definition, have different objectives and agendas. Intentions of a rising power like the PRC, are generally the results of its domestic institutional arrangement primarily its historically defined political structure, economic system, cultural and religious factors, and its leadership's mentality. The analysis of the intentions of the rising power should therefore be at least valued as important as the analysis of its capabilities. Intentions of the rising power may in fact be the factor determining the rising power to be a challenging, aggressive even imperialistic power or a more powerful nation with accommodateable demands and limited thus tolerable alterations to the system. The differences in values and utility functions, more than the growing capabilities, perhaps deserve more scrutiny. The Chinese seem to be aware of this. The official *Renmin Ribao* repeated in its essays that:

> Whether a country constitutes a threat to world peace (or other countries) depends not on its size, strength, or growth rate but on what type of foreign policy it adopts.26

Therefore, officially, Beijing has been very cautious about its words that may be interpreted as to be challenging to the West. The reform and opening have transformed Chinese value-system towards an assimilation with the West. Yet, clear and deep differences exist between China and the West, primarily in the areas of ideology and human rights especially political rights. That understanding, however, needs to be further analyzed thus qualified for the West to avoid a misjudgment of hence improper responses to China’s power and intentions through exaggerating its peculiarities.
Unlike the former Soviet Union, Beijing now has a diminishing ideological identity and no religious affiliations. The Chinese communism and CCP were very different from the Soviet ones at the very beginning. The Chinese, including most of the CCP cadres, have now apparently all involved in a grand marketization of their economic, social and even political lives. Western values and way of life have not only become the models for the Chinese youth, they have been authentically practiced in the PRC. One now perhaps needs to travel to Southern China, for example, to see, ironically, what a "genuine" capitalism is.\textsuperscript{27} Field trips in China easily reveal that American way of life and American entertainment and media have deeply captured the hearts and soul of the educated youth. A variety of beliefs, ranging from voodoo-like superstition, various denominations of the world's major religions, to ancestor-worship, has been competing with the official communist ideology. Christianity especially Protestantism has been growing the fastest even in the Chinese villages.\textsuperscript{28}

The Chinese economy has been rapidly moving towards an essentially capitalist or market economy, albeit still incomplete and heavily distorted. The authoritarian "communist" CCP regime now controls roughly the same proportion of the Chinese economy as Paris does of the French economy. Official statistics showed that the PRC state’s control of industrial production declined from 70 percent in 1979 to 5 percent in 1995, and control of retail pricing fell from 95 percent in 1979 to less than 6 percent in 1994.\textsuperscript{29} Beijing’s authoritarian control of labor allocation declined similarly fast in the past 15 years.\textsuperscript{30} Extensive economic and culture bonds have already developed between China and the outside primarily the West. Some even estimated that as much as 20-40 percent of China’s GNP now is made from foreign trade.\textsuperscript{31} Trade, business, and profit rather than ideology have become the national objectives for the once revolutionary Chinese. Pursuing profits on the international market has colored the Chinese foreign policy to be a rather typical neo-mercantilist policy.\textsuperscript{32}
As the heir to the long lasting ancient Chinese civilization, the PRC enjoys a stable and homogenous culture relatively free of religious zeal. Racially or ethnically, China is also homogenous as the Han is now the majority in every part of China except Tibet. A common written language and the relentlessly promoted Mandarin pronunciation have made China one of the few among the most densely populated countries to have just one language. There has been little, if any, question about such a homogeneity and unity. Politically, such a homogeneous nation provides the Leninist authoritarian regime with strong support at an era of rapid economic development and social changes. Produced the powerful Confucian culture and then nourished by this culture, the family structure has always been the cell of the Chinese nation and the basis on which the Chinese state with unquestioned power being maintained. A Chinese culture originated from this historical legacy has thus generated a peculiar view on the government-subjects relationship. “The ruler or government, as the grand family/clan head (dajiazhang), has an obligation to work for the well-being of its subordinate members…. [Thus the] legitimacy of the government does not come from votes but from promoting the welfare of the people.”

To many in- and outside the government, the CCP earned its dajiazhang power through long and hard violent struggles. To perhaps even more, the rapid economic development of the PRC and the economic melt-down of the former Soviet Union have been sufficient reasons to justify the monopoly of political power by the CCP. Still preaching its Chinese version of communism, the "revolutionary" CCP has nonetheless lost almost all of its revolutionary drive and courage. This one-party rule, currently under Jiang Zemin, is seen as having no serious alternatives or organized competitors, although it may be logically in conflict with the market-oriented economic development that requires and produces diversity, mobility, and political participation. As long as the CCP can continue to generate or allow for a satisfying economic development, a political stability in the PRC is expected.
Despite the marketization of its economy and the discoloring of its official ideology, the CCP regime itself is likely to be the source of differences between China and the West. The most apparent and well-known difference has been Beijing's treatment of individual rights and especially the political rights. The most vivid illustration of that was the lively verbal exchanges between the U.S. President and the Chinese President in their much anticipated joint-press conference of Sino-American Summit in Washington in the fall of 1997.\textsuperscript{36} Fully aware of those differences, Beijing defends itself by arguing for nationally-defined and specific concept and criteria of human rights.\textsuperscript{37} Chinese notion of human rights is said to include four components: the right to survival, right to development, political rights of the citizens, and social rights. The Western notion of political and civil rights is considered just one part of human rights. To emphasize on the right to survival and development, argued Chinese government and scholars, is currently more important than providing Western style of civil and political rights to the 1.2 billion Chinese.\textsuperscript{38}

Westerners especially American politicians may have taken the differences regarding human rights very, arguably too, seriously. The Chinese, however, do not seem to share nearly as much concern. Conveniently walled-in behind the shield of national sovereignty and internal affairs, Chinese elites seem to believe that, as long as the human rights advocates in the West could not succeed in highjacking their foreign policy toward China, the differences in human rights are only of minor importance and will wither away as the Chinese economic development proceeds further and China is stronger so to be of lesser a target of criticism.

Perhaps a sign of self-awareness of the shortcomings of China's political system, Chinese intellectuals generally adopt a defensive position rather than promoting its political system. Other than a few popular readings, there are hardly any Chinese writings, openly published or internal, suggesting that Chinese ought to impose their understanding of human rights onto the West as they getting stronger. On the contrary, many imply that
the Western notion of human rights may eventually take place in China as they suggest that the Western criticism against Chinese human rights problems are simply an act of "impatience" if not of evil intentions. More specifically, many seem to believe that Beijing should at least acknowledge part of the responsibilities for the tragedy in June of 1989, yet they commonly prefer what Deng Xiaoping allegedly instructed: avoiding the controversy for the sake of political stability and letting history make the final judgment in the future. A common response has been that the Westerners' criticisms against China for its human rights problems have been prompted by their fear of a different and strong China, their ignorance of the Chinese culture and history, or their evil intention to make an enemy out of China. Western criticisms may cause some moves in Beijing to improve its human rights record for practical considerations and diplomatic interests, but may also produce considerable resentments and misgivings among the Chinese youth, who tend to view Western criticisms of the Chinese political system as attacks on the nationhood and statehood of China.

The different treatment of human rights especially political rights in the PRC is likely to continue for sometime. An official reversal of the case of June 4, 1989, exonerating the political dissidents, still appears to be politically very costly to the CCP leadership. The proponents of China's political democracy and individual freedom are expected to keep their pressures on. Certain improvement of human rights record in the PRC and some form of "de-linking" or deemphasis of this difference in the West, however, are very likely and perhaps very desirable to both the Chinese and the existing major powers. Early signs of willingness to make changes thus to head-off Western criticisms can be detected even in the writings by some pro-CCP analysts. The quiet release of Wei Jingsheng, the most symbolic Chinese political prisoner since 1979, in November of 1997 may further demonstrate that Beijing is willing to make some gestures to improve its image in the West.
In short, unlike other rising powers in modern history, the PRC has no known international ambitions based on ideological, religious, or racial claims. (Even the United States had a clearly imperialistic impulse, as an asserted "manifest destiny" was inciting the young American power onto the road of imperialism one hundred years ago.) The differences, mainly centered around Beijing’s political system, between China and the existing major powers are easy to see and may rightfully cause concerns in the West. They are likely to be a major point of contention in the near future. Yet China seems to have accepted the basic ideological orientation of the West and thus have little ambition to impose its views onto the other nations. The peculiar Chinese value system and norms, already blended into the official national interests of the PRC, should be interpreted, perhaps more accurately, as a cover and a defense of CCP’s political interests which do not fit the Western value system. Unlike an "ordinary" rising power, therefore, Beijing lacks the moral callings to take adventurous foreign policies, let along an expansionist or colonial program. Furthermore, behind the value differences, there lies a very strong political reason for conservatism in China's foreign policy-making: a peculiar mentality of siege and thus a persisting sense of insecurity of the CCP leadership.

*The Best National Security Environment versus CCP’s Sense of Insecurity*

There seems to be an intriguing and profound contradiction in China's self-image especially its strategic concerns. On the one hand, Chinese leaders and analysts have openly concluded in the 1990s that, as a nation, China now clearly feels secure and enjoys the best security posture "since World War II" or "even since the Opium War" of 1840-42. On the other hand, there has been a strong insecure feeling lingering inside the CCP leadership. Often times, this feeling demonstrates itself as a peculiar mentality of under siege. Beijing's sometimes "irrational" responses to the criticisms of its political actions have been largely motivated by such a mentality.
Thanks largely to the foresight of American statesmen, mainly Franklin D. Roosevelt, China already has a nominally satisfied "world power" status. Now the PRC is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and one of the five "legal" nuclear powers. The nominal world power status and the apparent national security, however, have not stopped the Chinese élites especially the CCP leadership from longing for an "equal" treatment and less threat from the existing major powers. One only needs to browse through the speeches and writings of the Chinese political leaders and academicians to see the deep fear for foreign-induced political instability, the conceivably justifiable concerns over "hegemonic" interventions in the Chinese "domestic affairs," the near paranoid sense of insecurity for a possible international siege or containment against China, and a strong longing to be taken "equally" by the leading nations. Such a feeling of insecurity and unfulfillment is perhaps natural to a rising power. The intensity of the PRC's clear sense of insecurity, however, perhaps should be better explained as the continuity of the CCP's besieged mentality, which contrasts strikingly with the well-grounded sense of national security of China.

The ruling CCP regime demonstrates a peculiar mentality mixing ambitious sense of mission with a strong fear of being under siege. Despite its ambitious plan and confidence of leading China into the promised land of the long "lost" greatness, respect, prosperity, and power, the CCP regime has been contested in its legitimacy; its authority and official ideology are under constant challenges from within and without, especially after 1989. Those internal and external pressures have forced Beijing to search for sanctuary in economic prosperity and nationalistic feelings or "patriotism." Not surprisingly, given the authoritarian nature of the PRC political system, the CCP's insecurity has essentially been translated, through its organizations and propaganda machines, to be the "national interests" of a rising Chinese power. Thus a false sense of national insecurity and siege has heavily influenced the Chinese strategic considerations, despite the fact that the Chinese nation has never been so secure in nearly two centuries. The leading arguments
offered by the CCP to combine its political interests with the national interests of China have been that "only the CCP can save China," "China can only develop well under the CCP leadership," and "no CCP, no New China." Such a line of argument has been rather persuasive to many Chinese since it does describe the nature and course of the state-led Chinese modernization. Moreover, to value one's political system as a vital part of its national interests is not exclusively a Chinese logic.

The CCP seems to be content with its domestic political monopoly. External respects or disrespects and criticisms, however, have now become the leading sources of CCP's political legitimacy or destabilization. Beijing was preparing for an "inevitable" world war at any time until 1983 when Deng Xiaoping assessed that a new world war was unlikely within ten years. The new leadership under Jiang Zemin in 1995 reestimated that "it is possible to earn an international peace for the next fifteen years" until 2010 when China and, in the leadership's calculation, the CCP regime as well, would expect to be strong enough to rid itself of the danger. A military invasion by foreign powers may be remote now, the CCP's sense of under international siege and feeling of insecurity still exists.

Despite China's obviously secure environment, the CCP regime may indeed have good reasons to feel insecure in the post-Cold War world where the dominant powers lead by the United States have appeared to be at odds with this last "communist" government. The growing Chinese capabilities have actually heightened the West's scrutiny and criticisms of the CCP political system. It is not difficult to imagine, looking out from Zhongnanhai (the headquarters of the CCP), the serious threat to China (actually, to the CCP political regime) of the democracy-promoting and human rights-advocating United States. The State Council of the PRC thus concluded that:

As long as China remains to be a socialist country with the Communist Party in power and as long as China does not adopt the American style political system, no matter how much Chinese economy develops, how much democracy in politics, and how
much improvement of human rights, (the U.S.) will just looking but not seeing and
listening but not hearing. As what people often said: 'prejudice is far worse than
ignorance.... [The U.S. is just] using human rights [issue] to interfere in Chinese
domestic politics and promote hegemonism and power-politics.42

Consequently, the PRC analysts talk about a "comprehensive security" goal, look
out with highly alerted eyes, and view international organizations or collective security
arrangements very suspiciously.43 A Foreign Ministry-backed journal published an article
asserting that a "grand strategy" of China must consider a "comprehensive security" of
"domestic and external security" and "not only military security but also political,
economic, and cultural security."44 Beijing vigilantly watches for dangers. Other than the
United States which is clearly the direct and likely most serious threat, nearly all of China's
neighboring countries are viewed internally as potentially "trouble-making": Japan " is
transforming from a potential threat to a real threat," Russia is "our long-term potential
rival," India "is the potential source of insecurity and instability in our southwestern
regions," the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) is the "direct party of
struggle over our sovereignty of Nansha (Spratly) islands" and the development of "a
larger ASEAN" would be a serious and unfavorable challenge to China.45

A sense of under a realistic international siege is clearly, if not prevalently, identifi-
able in today's Beijing. While it is perhaps penetratingly correct to say that the differences
between the PRC and the US are not exactly ideological or political,46 the
Western/American threat to the CCP regime, not necessarily the Chinese nation, appar-
ently weighs heavily in Beijing's strategic calculation of the post-Cold War world.
Practically, however, between the national sense of security and the insecurity of the
ruling regime, Beijing has become profoundly sensitive and susceptible to external pres-
sures and incentives.

Strategic Concerns and the Rise of Nationalism
With the mentality of being politically under siege, the CCP regime has concluded that the fundamental Chinese national interests should include three components at this time: First, to safeguard the PRC political system, i.e., the stability of the CCP regime; Second, to maintain the peaceful international environment for the economic development of China; Third, to unify the motherland, i.e., to take back Hong Kong (in 1997), Macao (to be realized in 1999), and Taiwan (no timetable yet but at least the status quo must be preserved).

The political stability of the CCP regime has seemed to be the top concern to Beijing. Not only the economic development is seen as the foundation for that goal, even the unification of the motherland may be delayed for the sake of political stability. Beijing has demonstrated remarkable patience and flexibility in its attempt to lure Taipei to the negotiation table thus to address the unification issue without the otherwise probable shocks to the political stability of the CCP. Semi-officially, Beijing has said that everything but its political system is on the table. Essentially, besides Taiwan, the rising power of the PRC, under the leadership of the CCP with its siege mentality, currently appears to have asked for very little beyond its own survival. Recalling what Germany, Japan, the former USSR, and even the United States wanted during their rise through the global ranks, the world may indeed feel lucky this time.

There are other concerns. The PRC has thorny friction with the existing major powers mainly the United States on issues of market access, WTO (World Trade Organization) membership, intellectual property rights protection, and Tibet. There are also a Sino-Indian border dispute, a Sino-Japanese dispute over Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands, and the disputes over the South China Sea islets. Those, however, are not the main strategic concerns of the PRC. In general, Beijing inclines to either make compromises after hard bargaining or postpone a settlement on those issues. Deng Xiaoping's low-profile and conservative guidelines for Chinese foreign policy after 1989 appears to be still in effect after his death despite the now surging criticisms from some radical nationalist
Based on that, Jiang Zemin proposed a 16-word US policy in 1993: *Zeng jia xin ren, jian shao ma fan, fa zhan he zuo, bu gao dui kang* (to enhance trust, reduce trouble, develop cooperation, and refrain from confrontation).\(^{50}\) It clearly reflects a similarly cautious, low-profile, cooperative, and patient approach.

Naturally accompany the rising status of national power, a rather "broad-based" nationalist sentiment of "Greater China" or "Greater PRC" is also on the rise inside China now. Not only several popular readings have cashed in successfully on those sentiments, serious scholars have also argued for a more assertive and more demanding Chinese foreign policy.\(^{51}\) By the late 1990s, the clearly-existing strong interest of Chinese readers has sustained the publication of dozens of books filled with nationalistic rhetoric and even xenophobic writings. Some, like the popular reading cleverly titled *China's Grand Strategy*, even outlined a future of China's destined "re-integration of Asia" and "new leadership" of the world in the next 15-30 years.\(^{52}\) A leading target of China's rising nationalism, not surprisingly, has been the United States. With an overwhelming desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the lone superpower, some Chinese nonetheless have predicted a collision course and succession process between the U.S. and China in the not very distant future. At least, the rising Chinese power may despise America's criticisms and act accordingly especially in the neighboring regions. One expert of America studies concluded in 1995:

Data shows that in recent years, in the eyes and minds of the Chinese public including most of the intellectuals and young students, the United States has changed from a friendly country to a bully and anti-China country. As time goes by, the US will eventually realize what kind of consequences its bad image in China will have done to its interests in the Asian-Pacific region.\(^{53}\)

Another article published by the military internally in late 1996 concluded that:
the United States has been against us everywhere on the important issues and wants to
contain us at every moment. For a considerably long period of time in the future, the
United States will be the most direct and most serious threat to us.54

Still under the conscious control by the CCP regime, the rising nationalism
nonetheless deserves the close attention of the existing major powers. Ironically perhaps,
the very CCP regime that is criticized by the West may actually do a better job in
controlling the potentially dangerous nationalism that is bound to be more common and
even radical in a more powerful and confident China. Any political regime in Beijing must
address the potentially explosive issue of Taiwan and other Chinese interests in conflict
with other nations. A non-communist Chinese government is by no means more likely to
compromise on the issues of Tibet or the South China Sea islets. On the contrary, a
"democratic" regime in Beijing, free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but
likely driven by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese power a much more
assertive, impatient, belligerent, and even aggressive force at least during the unstable
period of fast ascendance to the ranks of world-class power. A democratizing China with
apparent and perhaps justifiable strategic concerns and demands, may actually be much
more likely to become a systemic challenger.55 The authoritarian CCP regime has been
able to shield itself from the newly rising nationalist sentiment.56 Beijing, for example, has
recently tried to stop the spread of radical nationalist sentiment in the PRC.57 But a
"democratic" regime would have a very difficult time to prevent such thoughts and ideas,
rather "natural" in a nation experiencing drastic changes and growth, from affecting and
even controlling the rising Chinese power.

*The Chinese Demands*

Besides the "let me live" political request of the CCP, the rising Chinese power is
not completely lacking of real and even ambitious demands. One analyst wrote in 1996:
The growth of the Chinese national power is the logical consequence of its economic reform. And the adjustment or development of Chinese foreign policy is the logical consequence of the growth of its power.\textsuperscript{58}

The most pressing desire, however, still appears to be on the issue of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{59} The developments in 1995-96 highlighted the explosive nature of this issue and led many in Beijing to believe that a military solution has appeared to be harder to avoid. If many on the island are attempting to change the status quo by seeking the full title of independence, increasingly many in Beijing may have also decided to solve the problem at an earlier date. The recent surge of nationalist sentiment has largely focused on a "decisive" and rapid solution of the division of the motherland. As a historical curse spelled on the CCP regime, to unify the motherland and finally eliminate domestic political rivalries on the island of Taiwan are intertwined with the political legitimacy of the CCP regime and thus an issue of vital national and political interests. Multiple sources in Beijing have indicated that the CCP leadership is determined to use force to prevent a Taiwanese independence even at the risk of openly opposing the American military might.\textsuperscript{60} For the Chinese leaders, there is indeed very little room of maneuver on the issue of Taiwan. Premier Li Peng told the visiting Vice President of the United States, Al Gore, in 1997 that:

The issue of Taiwan has always been the most important and most sensitive core issue of the Sino-American relationship.\textsuperscript{61}

Taiwan issue will continue to be a great card offered by the two sides of the Taiwan Striate for the United States and others to play. Yet it is a very sensitive issue that constantly reminds many Chinese how bluntly the existing major powers primarily the Americans have been trespassing on Chinese "domestic" affairs with their deliberately "ambiguous" policies. On this issue, we detect very little differences among the Chinese elites, officials, youth, and even political exiles. One senior official close to Jiang Zemin openly stated at Harvard University that on the unification issue, Beijing has no room for negotiation and to maintain the status quo is in the Chinese and American interests.\textsuperscript{62}
Chinese seem to have realized that the U.S. is not necessarily interested in having an independent Taiwan. One internal journal asserts:

The issue of Taiwan is a card in the hands of the United States with relevance to its strategic interests in Northeast Asia. The U.S. will inevitably use this card to bargain with (China). To maintain the status quo of division between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait fits best (American) interests.\(^{63}\)

Another likely Chinese demand is the rights of the islets in the South China Sea and the related and much talked about expansion of the Chinese naval force. Despite its insistence that it has the indisputable sovereignty over all of those islets and the surrounding waters, Beijing has agreed to shelve the disputes and allow some "joint explorations" to proceed.\(^{64}\) Aware of its own limited naval capabilities and the still uncertain value of the region, Beijing seems to have decided to postpone the "show down" on this issue with its competitors to avoid prematurely "internationalizing" the issue, i.e., bringing in the United States.\(^{65}\) The growth of the Chinese Navy have caught more attentive eyes. Indeed, Chinese analysts have clearly longed: "had we had a strong enough fleet to appear in the Taiwan Straits first, who would have dared to try to interfere with Chinese domestic politics with force?"\(^{66}\) A senior officer in the PLA Navy wrote recently to advocate that Beijing should put more emphasis on the development of naval power and use it more routinely to protect the growing Chinese maritime interests. He also hinted that China may indeed demand more maritime rights and interests in the future—the so-called "maritime space"—which according to his calculation is disproportionately small for the Chinese (only 30 percent of the size of Chinese territory versus the world average of 94 percent). Yet he apparently believed that the United Nations' Law of Sea is in the Chinese interests and what the PLA Navy wanted is to "protect our legitimate interests" as stipulated by the Law of Sea.\(^{67}\)

Beyond Taiwan and the South China Sea and on a more grand scale, according to some analysts in Beijing, the rising Chinese power may proactively seek a "counter-con-
tainment" strategy against the existing major powers to secure its political regime and create rooms of making new demands especially in East Asia. Sounded like a realist strategist, Deng Xiaoping prescribed for the PRC in the 1980s that:

How much role we can play in international affairs depends on how much achievement of our economic construction. If our country developed and became more prosperous, we would play a larger role in international affairs. Our current role in international affairs is not small; but if our material basis and material capabilities are enhanced, [our] role will be even larger.\(^68\)

More active Chinese participation in the management of international affairs and a more evenly constructed multipolar world sound more satisfactory to Beijing. Therefore, the PRC prefers to be first given a great power (daguo) responsibility in the Asian-Pacific region to ensure a "just and rational" new security order in the region. A quadrangular arrangement of the US, Japan, China, and Russia should replace the unfavorable bilateral US-Japan alliance. China can then "rightfully" play its role of "balancer" thus to "share" the major powers' responsibility for the region's security.\(^69\) Beyond that, China could take advantage of the differences between the United States and its allies in Europe -- the so-called strategy of "utilizing the West-West conflicts" by forging more ties between the "rising Asia" and the European Union. On the last day of 1996, the official *Renmin Ribao* illustratively put "the successful Asian-European Summit" (held in Malaysia in March of 1996) as the number one item on its annual list of "Top Ten International News in 1996."

An American-European-Asian tripolarity may thus replace the American-European-Japanese dominance, and a five power (US, Russia, China, Japan, and European Union) structure may replace the "one superpower plus multiple major powers" situation currently seen.\(^70\) An internally published analysis argued more bluntly that:

We must seize the opportunity, develop ourselves, and to further strengthen our position and function in our neighboring areas. ... (We) must be strategic and grasp the initiatives in the management of the affairs in our neighboring regions... to skillfully
handle the several triangular relationships for the strategic interests of China: the big China-US-Japan triangle and the (five) small triangles of China-Japan-ASEAN, China-Japan-Russia, China-India-Pakistan, China-Japan-South Korea, and China-North Korea-South Korea.\textsuperscript{71}

In very general terms, some Chinese analysts have suggested that in the 21st century, China's strategic goal of international politics and diplomacy "should be for a peaceful, democratic, harmonious and cooperative new international political-economic order." Such a new order will depart from the past history of hegemonic struggles of five centuries. China should work to reach "such a goal: Through the rise of a multipolar world, [we] will make the lone superpower of the United States to have a smooth and dignified 'soft landing' type of transformation to become a normal major power, a normal pole."\textsuperscript{72} Yet, such an aspiration has not been a consensus in the PRC. To deal with the United States with extra care, however, has appeared to be the common view in Beijing. Internally, analysts suggested that China may oppose "hegemonic policies" of the United States but need "to recognize its superpower status and its influence on the global major issues."\textsuperscript{73} A more scholarly work concluded that:

The United States is the world's only superpower after the Cold war and its position will continue for at least another 20-30 years to come.... Thus, avoiding military confrontation with the United states is China's long-term strategic and security interest.\textsuperscript{74}

A rising Chinese power is likely to develop new and more concrete demands and Beijing may argue for an effective, if not entire, accommodation. The nature of those demands will depend on the circumstances in the future and mainly the responses of the existing major powers to the already stated demands of the PRC. So far, few of Beijing's known demands have appeared to threaten the vital interests of the existing major powers, nor constitute a fundamental challenge to the existing international political and economic order. They appear to be largely relating to the neighboring areas of China and wanting a
true major power status, not just the nominal one, for the PRC. Furthermore, the
realpolitik logic and realist rationale as well as geopolitical perspectives of the Chinese
strategists\(^7\) have appeared to be very Western-like and have little ideological or racial
overtones. Of course, realpolitik logic may lead Beijing to demand more when it becomes
much stronger. A natural inference is that the Chinese demands especially the one on
Taiwan, if ignored by the existing major powers for too long, could well ignite and fuel a
dangerously aggressive nationalism in a stronger and perhaps a more democratic China.

**Conclusion**

China currently enjoys the best security posture since the 19th century and the
highest economic growth in its long history. The rapidly growing Chinese economy is
making the PRC a rising power that may rival the most powerful nations in the foreseeable
future. But that much anticipated ascendance to world power status is by no means
guaranteed. What China wants and will act are not exactly settled even among the Chinese
themselves. China's self-image has reflected and been affected by that fact. A more pow-
erful China is likely to further increase the self-confidence of the Chinese leaders. Primarily
on the issue of human rights, China will be, or arguably have to be, different from the
West for some time to come. Under the overall self-labels of "socialist market economy
with Chinese characteristics" or "the primary stage of socialism with Chinese
characteristics," China has shown a mixed picture of self-image: one that is filled with
increasing self-assurance, assertiveness, and some ambitious aspirations but also deep
concerns, uncertainties, and fears. Moreover, Beijing has a peculiar but old mentality of
politically under siege and thus experiences a strong sense of insecurity. The growth of
China's capabilities has ironically enhanced Beijing's political insecurity as the West is now
"compelled" to increase it scrutiny and criticism of the CCP's political system in the rising
Chinese power. The political insecurity of the CCP regime has already been translated into
the definition of the Chinese national interests. The rising power of China has thus shown
a clear, though perhaps false, sense of insecurity. Consequently, China has only a short list of fairly transparent and limited demands centered around the CCP's political survival and a reunification with Taiwan.

Such a peculiar self-image and limited strategic intentions are likely to sustain a rather conservative, conformist, and defensive Chinese foreign policy. The "approval" and support from the existing major powers have been viewed as a source of legitimacy to the CCP regime which is eagerly searching for that for its political self-preservation. In fact, the CCP has pinned its legitimacy and ruling ability on that effort with a wholesale slogan called "to connect to the tracks of the world" (yu shijia jiegui). The rapid socioeconomic and inevitably political development such as a national democratization in the PRC, however, may soon solve the political insecurity issue for China. Thus to lead to a more confident and active rising power. Two external factors could also profoundly affect China's self-image, its strategic intentions, and moves abroad: Drastic events concerning Taiwan or enhanced encroaching actions by the existing major powers. Such external developments could force China to act out its persisting sense of insecurity. In either of these cases, China's self-image would predictably be highlighted and enhanced by foreign stimuli thus become more assertive, singular, and even twisted. China's strategic intentions, therefore, could become much more nationalistic and even dangerously militant and aggressive.
Notes

*. An article addressing the U.S. China policy, based on the analysis of this chapter, has been published as "To Incorporate China: A New Policy for a New Era" in The Washington Quarterly, 21-1, Winter (January) 1998. A grant from the Georgia Tech Foundation helped the research for this paper. The author thanks Yong Deng and the other contributors of this book for their very helpful comments.


6. Author's interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, 1996-97.

7. Liu Jiang (deputy chief of Xinhua News Agency's International Department): "Shixi Zhongmei jianshixin zhanlue huoban guanxi" (Preliminary analysis of the Sino-American strategic partnership relations), Shijia xinshi yanjou (Studies of world's situations), Beijing, no. 47, 1997, 2. The same author: "Zhongmei guanxi de xianzhuan he fazhan qushi" (The state and prospects of Sino-American relations), Shijia xinshi yanjou (Studies of world's situations), Beijing, no. 26, 1997, 3.

8. Yan Xuetong: "Xifangren kan zhongguo de jueqi" (Westerns view the rise of China), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), Beijing, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, No. 9, 1996, 37.


13. Lu Shi: "Zhuding puomide berimong" (A daydream doomed to be shattered -- refuting the 'theory of containing China'), in *Guangmin Ribao*, Beijing, August 25, 1995, 3.


18. Yan Xuetong: "Xifangren kan zhongguo de jueqi" (Westerns view the rise of China), *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations), Beijing, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, No. 9, 1996, 45.


25. Whether the former Soviet Union was a genuinely rising power is debatable. With an economic system destined to fail, the surge of Soviet power was clearly unbalanced, unsustainable and perhaps exaggerated as well. A different age of globalized economy and communication as well as the existence of nuclear weapons thus facilitated the inevitable implosion of such a pre-modern power.


28. For a case study of religious diversification in the Chinese rural areas, see, Yang Hongshan “Wandong nongcun ‘jidujiao re’ diaoaca yu sikao” (An investigation and reflection on the “Christianity Craze” in rural east Anhui), in Jianghuai luntang (Jianghuai forum), Hefei, 1994 (4).


33. Only in Ningxia and Guangxi, the Chinese Muslims and the Zhuang people are the majorities. Yet the distinctions between these two groups of "minorities" and the Han are increasingly hard to see now.

34. Ren Xiao: “Zhenzi wenhua de fangxeng” (A reflection on political culture), in Zhongguo shuping (China book reviews), Hong Kong, 1994 (1), 117.


37. For a thorough examination of China's view on human rights, see Chapter 5 of this book.

38. For an elaboration on these views, see Yan Xuetong: Zhongguo guojia liyi fengxi (An analysis of China's national interests), Tianjin, Tianjin Renmin Press, 1996, 201-207, 217-252.

39. Almost all of the PRC official responses and many of the Chinese writings (such as the edited volumes by Wen Jianming and Xu Ming cited earlier) have unmistakably expressed such responses. Radical publications are even more confrontational to the West's criticisms.

40. For an interesting discussion on "the need" to develop and reform Marxism as the official ideology, to refine Chinese culture through market competition, and to reappreciate the value of individualism, see Wen Jianming 1997, 76-85.

41. The CCP's 14th National Congress concluded in this way in 1992. For scholarly elaboration on this general assessment, see Shen Qurong, Vice President of the China Institute of Contemporary

43. For a thorough examination of China's views and policies regarding collective security, see Chapter 4 of this book.
44. Tang Yongsheng: "Zhonghe anquan yu zhongti zhanlui (Comprehensive security and grand strategy)." *Shijie Zhishi* (World Affairs), Beijing, 1996, No. 20 (Oct. 16), 16-17.
45. Yang Jianyong: "Guanyu woguo zhoubian anquan huanjing de fenxi yu sikao" (An analysis and thinking on the security environment of our nation), in *Yatai Cankao* (Asia-Pacific reference), an internal publication, Beijing, No. 34 (August 19), 1996. Ren Rongrong: "Dadongmeng de jiuqi he Zhongguo de duice" (The rise of a larger ASEAN and China's policy), in *Yatai Cankao* (Asia-Pacific reference), an internal publication, Beijing, No. 38 (September 16), 1996
47. For an examination of China's conception of national interest, see Chapter 2 of this book.
48. The author was told by senior CCP officials repeatedly in 1995-96 that even the national flag, name, and anthem of the PRC can all be changed through the negotiations between Beijing and Taipei for the new united China By 1998, there was a growing view inside Beijing arguing for the political "disadvantages" of a rapid reunification with Taiwan.
49. Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian et al., *Zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu -- Zhongguo keyi shuo bu xupin: Guoji guanxi bianshu yu women de xianshi yingfu* (China still can say no -- The sequel to China can say no: The variables in international relations and our realistic handling), Beijing: Zhongguo Wenlian Press, October, 1996. This is the sequel to the controversial popular reading of *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu -- Lengzhanhou shidai de zhengzhi yu qinggan jueze* (China can say no -- the political and emotional choice in the post-Cold War era) by the same authors. For a critical review of the two influential books, see Fei-Ling Wang: "Ignorance, Arrogance, and Radical Nationalism," in *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 14 (Spring) 1997, 161-165.
(Containment or engagement?)” in Guoji wenti yanjiu (International Affairs), Beijing, No. 1, 1996, 6. A slightly different version of this article appeared in Beijing Review, Oct. 21-27, 1996, No. 43, 6-9.

51. For example, see Luo Weilong: ”Zhongguoren yao shuo bu (Chinese want to say no),” in Taipingyang Xuebao (Pacific journal), Beijing, No. 2, 1995. For an examination of the rising nationalism and anti-American feelings in the PRC, see Chapter 7 of this book.


53. Niu Jun: ”Duoshi zhichou: Zhongmei guanxi de xianzhuang ji qianji (The troubling autumn: the current situation and prospect of the Sino-American relations),” in Meiguo Yanjiu (American Studies), Beijing, No. 4, 1995, 134. For the opinion surveys describing the U.S. as the ”most disliked country” amongst the Chinese youth, see Xu Ming ed.1997, 547-548.


57. Hong Kong newspapers reported that Beijing ordered in the Fall of 1996 a ban on media coverage of the two very popular readings advocating radical nationalism and crude anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiments. Ma Shih-t’u: ”Why Have the CCP Authorities Banned ‘China Can Say No’?–’China Can Still Say No’ Is Accused of Heterodoxy.” In Hong Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), Oct. 29, 1996, 18. FBIS-CHI-96-218.


59. For a thorough examination of China’s views and recent policies on Taiwan, see Chapter 11 of this book.

60. Author’s interviews with PRC officials and PLA officers in 1995-96. The Vice-Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission, General Zhang Zhen, reiterated publicly the situations in which the PRC will definitely use force to solve the Taiwan issue. Chang Hsiao-Ming: ”Zhang Zhen Stresses That Taiwan Issue Must be Solved by Force in Three Situations, and Under Eight Circumstances.” In Hong Kong Ping Kuo Jih Pao, Dec. 19, 1996, a18. FBIS-CHI-96-245.


63. Tang Yongxing: "Zhongmei guanxi jinru yige xinde lishi jieduan" (Sino-American relations have entered a new historical stage), *Shijia xinshi yanjou* (Studies of world's situations), Beijing, no. 26, 1997.


65. Wang Yuzhou: "Lianheguo haiyangfa gongyue yu zhongguo" (The UN law of Sea and China), in *Taipingyang xuebao* (Pacific journal), Beijing, No. 2 (Summer), 1996, 9-17.


70. For an extensive discussion on those ideas by Chinese scholars and analysts, see Xiao Ding: "Yaou hezuo yu fazhan wenti yantaohui jiyao (Summary of the Symposium on Asian-European cooperation and development)," in *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary international relations), Beijing, No. 7, 1996, 42-53.


73. Tang Yongxing: "Zhongmei guanxi jinru yige xinde lishi jieduan" (Sino-American relations have entered a new historical stage), *Shijia xinshi yanjou* (Studies of world's situations), Beijing, no. 45, 1997, 4.

