Introduction

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We hope you’ll find this issue of *Polygraph* to be a particularly “lively” one. By framing the issue through the prism of three central concepts—biopolitics, narrative, and temporality—we hope to shed some light onto the politics of life, or experience, today. We affirm the argument that politics today assumes as its primary object life itself, a common denominator of the various theories of biopolitics. Rather than focus the issue on one of the various articulations of biopolitical theory, we instead address the common denominator of these theories: the claim that politics today assumes as its primary object life itself. Our intention in taking up “life”—as a concept for critical theory, in its political and philosophical conceits, but also in its real, immediate, and particular existence—in relation to concerns of narrative and temporality is to bring to the abstraction “life” considerations of its concretization and actualization. One of the central conceits of this issue is the belief that the schemata that narratives provide for our understanding of temporality and our figuration of time have political effects: effects on how we imagine change (in both its possibility and its potential forms), agency (be it individual, institutional, or collective), and indeed our own being. As such, narrative has the capacity to modulate our conception of “life”—what it is, as well as what it can be—and, as a consequence, our practice of that life in the everyday. By shifting the focus of biopolitical investigation from the arena of “bare life” to that of the qualified life implied by the everyday, we also hope to open up the biopolitical more directly to questions of discourse and meaning-making. Indeed, the articles contained in this volume demonstrate that, in the construction of “life” as constituted by the biopolitical field, the “real” is never just that, but also imagined; the immediate is already mediated; and the particular is always tempered by the other, the general, and the universal.

It is such a “tempering” with which the *Polygraph* collective lately has addressed questions of the biopolitical, owing

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to the traditions that those such as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze both took up and instantiated. Recent issues of *Polygraph* examined these traditions and their interlocutors, placing the field of the biopolitical under the microscopic lenses offered by such varied figurations as Deleuze’s “line of flight,” the ontological planes of immanence and transcendence, and the universalistic mode of thought presented by the philosophy of Alain Badiou. The present consideration continues this refractive examination, at times placing the question of the biopolitical at its focal center, at other times exploring its indeterminable crevices, from its motivating origins in the Greek concept of *bios*, as Sarah Clift examines in our issue’s first treatment, to the more recent figures presented by the “inimical life” of the outlaw and the politics of death, or *thanatopolitics*, of the suicide bomber, as Ian Baucom and Stuart J. Murray, respectively, construct them in the final two essays. We would like to imagine that the question of the biopolitical—or of what biopolitics is—has been furthered over the time of our recent body of work, and it is time itself that we use to examine the question in this *Polygraph*. Time as life, time as story, time, indeed, as death. Each of these accounts offers hope for the potentiality of time as a constitutive political form—time, that is, as resistance.

Michel Foucault began to tell the story of the biopolitical—some say with great license—through the history of sovereignty and its growing concern with governmentality, or the regulation of the population over which it maintained authority. This focus on the population as a whole relied at once on a subjugation of the human body that arose with the emergence of the disciplinary society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when, as Foucault describes, “in the army, colleges, workshops, and schools we see the development of a training of the body as a useful body. New procedures of surveillance, control, spatial distribution, and notion, et cetera are perfected. The body is invested by mechanisms of power that seek to render it both docile and useful.” Such were the disciplinary “technologies of power” with which sovereign authority concerned itself. However, emerging in the late eighteenth century was a new technology of power, not solely disciplinary and no longer focused specifically on the individual body, but rather a “biopolitics” taking the population or human species as its object, “a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on.” The technologies of power at play in this emerging biopolitics relied less on the disciplining of individual bodies than the techniques it would utilize on the population as a whole, from the study of endemic diseases and illnesses, to the use of statistics, measures, estimates, and forecasts allowing for the popular generalization, the attendancy to mortality and health, and the “rational” mechanisms of insurance, individual and collective savings, safety, and security measures. Foucault refers to these mechanisms as technologies of *biopower*, more specifically, one separate from that of the absolute power of sovereignty: “Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and letting die.” This paradigm between sovereignty and governmentality, from “taking life and letting live” to “making live and letting die,” presents the early narrative of what would come to constitute the biopolitical as a field of inquiry.
Death, for its part, is excepted from the ubiquitous object of “life” in contemporary politics, and this non-relation produces forms of narrative and concepts of temporality incongruous with those of the previous era. As in Dickens’s last novel, Our Mutual Friend, which Ian Buchanan examines in this issue, the individual is left to experience death in private, in the body of the malcontent Rogue Riderhood, while his life becomes generalized, the property of those around him to “make live.”

Death, indeed, is a common theme throughout this issue, be it in correspondence with the finite tendencies of narrative form or be it as a mode of interpretation. Along with Dickens’s final novel, the “last work,” the eulogy, and the obituary each become an object of narrative’s relation to the constitution of “life.” Death is examined here as a contestational praxis against biopolitical power, as well as an anachronistic yet very real deployment of its method of control, as discipline and sovereignty still very much exist as technologies of biopower. Gilles Deleuze locates effects of the two types of power in the figure of Kafka’s Josef K., who in The Trial finds himself suspended between the apparent acquittal of the disciplinary society’s techniques of massification and individuation (two poles that operate in tandem to create spaces of confinement) and the endless postponement of a society of control, which instead coordinates minute and continuous adjustments in access and behavior through the development of mobile codes or passwords.

Deleuze’s use of Kafka’s narrative to elaborate his extension of Foucault’s biopolitical analysis to the “society of control” indicates his estimation of the political importance of narrative art. Tellingly, he attributes the diagnosis of this regime of control to the literature of William Burroughs, attesting to the creative and productive abilities of fictional narrative to both identify and resist power. “Art is resistance,” says Deleuze in another place. “It resists death, slavery, infamy, shame.” History tells us the story of a pre-modern William Tell, who, upon shooting an apple from his son’s head, proclaimed, “I am free!” and was released from the shackles of sovereign authority. Burroughs, having attempted and failed at a similar feat, renders in Naked Lunch the stark reality that, in the control society, freedom is no longer thought to be achievable in a pure form; rather, negotiations, escapes, and resistances must be exacted within, outside, and against the dominant technologies of power. Often such resistance comes in the form of diagnoses (both “clinical” and “critical”) of blockages and failures (the extreme example of which is death itself), which fiction raises to the level of resistance through the demand for “the missing people.” Or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in their book on Kafka: “The literary machine thus becomes a relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come, not at all for ideological reasons but because the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere in this milieu: literature is the people’s concern.”

Similar figurations and diagnoses of biopolitical “life” arise in the articles presented here, from the ghost-images experienced by the protagonist of Don DeLillo’s novella The Body Artist to the “diminished” Paul Rayment of J.M. Coetzee’s recent novel Slow Man. Rachel Smith offers the former as an affective embodiment of “good grief,” a mode of biopolitical resistance outside the psychoanalytical discourse of mourning and melancholia, while, for Grant Farred, Coetzee’s work articulates a “cosmopoliti-
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cal life” contesting the controlling manifestations of universalism. The various forms of life engendered here—affective, cosmopolitan, feminist, emergent, prosthetic, and precarious—aim to disrupt biopower’s regime of control by negotiating its interstices, borders, and lines of flight. 11

But these modes of resistance beg yet another question on which we must constantly dwell: in what manner is narrative also a form of control? Narratives provide not only figures that call power into question but also establish normative patterns and preconceptions. This means that narrative can expand our capacity to imagine the world (and ourselves) differently, but it can also limit that capacity through the repetition of normative forms or the management of mediated desire. Particularly in an age in which flexibility, mobility, and choice are so prevalent (at least in those areas which used to be called the “first world”; the periodization of the present appears to us more complex when “underdeveloped” or “developing” nations, peoples, and economies enter the picture), power must operate in the most subtle of ways, offering apparent options while also determining in advance our responses to this apparent freedom. The control that normative narratives (life-narratives, certainly, but also narratives of social development, politics, historicism, etc.) provide takes on a greater role as the forms taken by power become more open and flexible (as opposed to the spaces of confinement of a disciplinary society). If it is indeed the case that politics today takes life as its object, then the analysis of different means by which narrative both figures and regulates temporality, as well as possible modes of subverting or bypassing such regulation, should remain on the agenda.

All of the contributors to this issue develop their own connections, explicit or implicit, between biopolitics and modes of meaning-making that impact our experience of time and temporality. Sarah Clift’s contribution to this issue develops an historical narrative of narrative forms, which provides a framework for thinking about the period specificity of forms of narration as well as the potential political significance of these forms. “Narrative life span, in the wake” does this by revisiting the writings of Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin on narrative and history, which chronicle the detachment of narrative forms from that of the finitude of human life. If, as both Benjamin and Arendt claim in different ways, the time of modernity is that of a purely quantitative time, detached from experience, we can also see, along with Paul Ricoeur, narrative as the principal means through which time is (re)made human and meaningful. 12 While not wishing to fall back into a naïve idea of the properly human, neither Benjamin nor Arendt (nor indeed Clift) wishes to abandon the idea of a meaningful time that is neither “empty” nor “homogeneous,” but one which remains open to qualitative difference.

The attempt to locate forms of meaningful time (identified here with the function of memory) is one of the consistent threads of this issue, whether it is articulated through Negri’s writings on the kairòs (which Rachel Smith takes up in her article), Merav Amir’s invocation of Elizabeth Grosz’s demand for a “reconceptualization of the future,” or Matteo Mandarini’s utopian vision of a “communist practice of
time.” Meaningful time is indeed what is at issue, although, as several of the essays included in this volume demonstrate, meaningful time is not necessarily liberatory. Merav Amir, for example, produces an analysis of how a particular mode of temporal meaning-making (producing a form of temporality that she describes as a “linear, goal-oriented, and clock-driven temporal pattern”) can function in the service of social control. In “Bio-Temporality and Social Regulation,” she takes the relation between human life span and narrative in a different direction than does Clift, employing Gilles Deleuze’s thesis about “control societies” to analyze the discourse of the biological clock as a control mechanism for ordering women’s life-narratives outside of the enclosed institutional space of the nuclear family. Amir contends that, as the capacity for this institutional space to manage the lives of women has decreased, the discourse of the biological clock has emerged to take its place, replacing a general social demand that women marry, stay at home, and produce offspring with the more flexible option of independence, supplemented with a new medicalized discourse of the “biological clock” (based on but not reducible to a biological reality known for centuries): the command is no longer “marry and reproduce” but “the choice is yours, but never forget that your time to make the (right) choice is running out!” While feminists have traditionally been reluctant to set Deleuze’s thought to work, Amir weds Deleuze’s thoughts on periodization and the dominant form of contemporary power to a concrete analysis of changing discursive strategies of containment, generating a functional descriptive scheme which should prove suggestive for further feminist research. At the same time, her use of Deleuze to address feminist problems serves as a well-needed reminder (too often forgotten by Deleuze’s adherents and detractors alike) that flexibility is not necessarily freedom, or, as Deleuze puts it in the “Postscript on Control Societies,” “[a] snake’s coils are even more intricate than a mole’s burrows.” At the conclusion of her analysis, Amir calls, as do many of the contributors to this issue, for us to “conceive alternative temporalities,” but her central concern in the article is to document in concrete terms the emergence of a particular normalizing narrative discourse about women’s bodies.

Matteo Mandarini provides a more general and abstract approach to temporality and biopolitics. His article continues the reclamation of Gilles Deleuze for political thought by producing an enlightening translation of Marx’s analysis of capital into Deleuzian terms, a translation which produces significant effects in Marxist thought (most notably, another approach to recent attempts to historicize and de-center the labor theory of value that has remained, for many, the bedrock of Marxism). As with Benjamin, Mandarini views the homogenization and standardization of time to be constitutive of modernity (although here the term employed is, as Fredric Jameson would have it in A Singular Modernity, simply “capitalism,” the motor force that throws up “modernity” as its obfuscatory cover). He describes it here in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms as (1) a differentiation of planes followed by (2) an axiomatization of time allowing for correspondences across planes or blocks of qualitatively distinct temporalities. This means that the function of capital is largely that of coordinating transferences and relations between different “practices of time” that are radically heterogeneous. This originary heterogeneity, according to Mandarini, allows for the
emergence of crisis as the “possibility of non-conversion,” the production of incommensurable times beyond the capacity of capital to coordinate them.

Mandarini remains close to Antonio Negri in his call for “an alternative set of conducts of time” as a constituent form of biopolitical resistance, a call which echoes those of Clift and Amir. Rachel Smith, for her part, attempts to provide one such example of an alternative conduct of time by bringing Don DeLillo’s meditation on grief in *The Body Artist* to bear on Hardt and Negri’s theorization of biopolitics. In doing so, Smith provides a rejoinder to the focus on the joyful passions in Hardt and Negri’s work (at the occasional expense of careful treatment of the sad passions, or Sianne Ngai’s “ugly feelings”) without resorting to a return to psychoanalytic theories of mourning and melancholia. As do Ian Buchanan and Grant Farred later in the issue, Smith helps literature to perform its own theoretical and philosophical work, producing the corresponding concept to the affects and percepts embodied in DeLillo’s novel, as Deleuze and Guattari might have put it. At the same time, Smith’s article points to the connectedness between affect and temporality, a connection dating back at least as far as Aristotle’s distinction between passion and action, but gaining new relevance as affect reappears on the agenda of political theorists and cultural and literary critics alike: witness thinkers as disparate as Brian Massumi, Eve Sedgwick, Paolo Virno, Lauren Berlant, Philip Fisher, and Sianne Ngai.

Eric Alliez and Jean-Claude Bonne provide a rather different elaboration of non-normative temporality by way of an engagement with Matisse’s murals, which they claim create “a becoming that does not produce, that shows nothing but itself, in the events to which it gives body.” This process of “giving life” (to use Matisse’s term) to space through an un-Formed becoming which opens space to the Outside of a multiplicity of forces brings us in contact with Deleuze’s concept of “inorganic life,” a concept which problematizes the rapid assimilation of the “bio” in biopolitics to the biological level of “life-processes” through the dehiscence of the term “life” from the idea of an organic entity. Alliez and Bonne thus elaborate a “bio-aesthetic,” a concept they develop out of the work of Deleuze and Guattari, that engenders a “becoming-life of art,” a “politics of sensation” in which art gives body to thoughts and events.

Ian Buchanan’s article “Deleuze’s ‘Life’ Sentences” continues this examination of what a properly Deleuzian notion of biopolitics might entail through a return to Deleuze’s encounter with Dickens in “Immanence: A Life…” Although he begins with a critique of Agamben’s treatment of Deleuze in “Absolute Immanence,” his conclusion that life is, for Deleuze, a presentation of “the possibility of … judgments being varied” through the encounter/separation of the actual from the virtual brings him quite close to Agamben’s claim that “form-of-life” (defined as “a life for which living itself would be at stake in its own living”) must not be considered as an ossified form or demographic category, but rather as “thought,” a continuous affection by one’s own capacity to be affected (and thus to be otherwise). Relevant here is not simply this unlikely proximity between Buchanan and Agamben, but the fact that Buchanan makes explicit the link between “pure thought” as the grasping of the gap between stability and dynamism (and the insufficiency of either of these taken separately) and
fiction as a means for making this gap apparent (a claim that resonates with Smith's argument regarding DeLillo's fiction).

In a similar spirit, Grant Farred asks us to reconsider not only what philosophy (what is now more popularly known as that amorphous entity called simply theory) can tell us about narrative, but also what the narrative encoding of experience can contribute to philosophical and political debate, in this case an exposure of the "old secret" of contemporary neo-Pauline universalism. He counters Alain Badiou's influential reading of Paul the apostle with J.M. Coetzee's Paul Rayment, whom Farred offers as an illustration of the titular "politics of prosthesis"—an illustration that unveils particularity as the "remnant" (in the sense Giorgio Agamben gives the term in *The Time That Remains*) of an exclusive universalism. In so doing, Farred locates the recent universalism, in particular that of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, as a poorly disguised attempt to secure philosophical and political authority for those already holding a majoritarian position, and he uses Paul's suppression of contending versions of possible Christianity (particularly those represented by the Gnostic Gospels) as an allegory of the present intellectual situation.

Our final two articles both deal with one of the major critiques of biopolitical theory: the concept of necropolitics (the "subjugation of life to the power of death") proposed by Achille Mbembe as a demand that the attention to a politics of life not elide the difficult fact that the administration of death remains a significant function of contemporary political power. Mbembe is less interested in arguing against biopolitics as a concept than in avoiding a too-rapid assumption that biopolitics as the management of life has simply replaced an older form of sovereignty based on the right to put to death. Thus, he writes (regarding Palestine) that "late-modern colonial occupation is a concatenation of multiple powers: disciplinary, biopolitical, and necropolitical." For the purposes of this issue, we consider the thesis of a necropolitics to be internal to the discourse surrounding biopolitics, not only because it was occasioned by Foucault's discussions of biopower and biopolitics but also because, if our wish is to develop more descriptive and efficacious terms to describe contemporary politics, we would do well to consider the "multiple powers" described by Mbembe in their complexity rather than simply avoiding questions of death in favor of a myopic view toward life. As the contents of this issue demonstrate, the terms of life and death are mutually co-implicated, as are the terms of any traditional dualism, and any attempt to isolate one from the other is fated to collapse in its own aporias.

Ian Baucom expands Mbembe's questioning regarding the limits of the theories of biopolitics by seeking a necropolitical figure that would serve a parallel function to that played by "bare life" in Agamben's version of biopolitics. The narrative he charts of the work of Francisco Goya leads him to designate such a figure as "inimical life," an enemy that does not fulfill the traditional requirements of enmity and that, for this reason, emerges as an enemy "not so much of any particular state but of the very concept, possibility, or institutions of the state-form itself." This form of life (a term we invoke here to signal Baucom's differentiation of inimical from bare life), epitomized by the figure of "the traitor, the robber, or the brigand," appears to the state as one of Kant's "unjust enemies," whom the state is authorized to dispose
of in any way it deems fit. Inimical life then marks, for Baucom, the site at which the rights of the state become unlimited, as bare life does for Agamben.

Both biopolitical and necropolitical thought have been forced by recent geo-political events to address the nature of contemporary war, and it is instructive to juxtapose the illuminations these two theories shed on the question of war. Hardt and Negri begin *Multitude* with an attempt to provide a biopolitical theory of war dealing with many of the same figures as does Baucom, but with a slight difference. The enemy, for example, does not so much become “unjust” as his or her existence allows for a “just” war, and in this way provides for the sovereign, as Baucom argues, “the constitutive function of legitimacy.” However, the difference becomes pronounced when we approach the functions that these figures serve for sovereignty. For the biopolitical theory of Hardt and Negri, the power of the sovereign to “rule directly over death” is a form of biopower rather than necropower because it produces a type of direct control over life in the form of torture. Further, Hardt and Negri contend that this power is legitimated by the production of an enemy so “unknown and unseen” (and therefore indestructible—think of “terrorism” as an enemy) that its monstrous abstraction allows the imperial power to enact the most rigid forms of control over daily life under the guise of security. For Baucom, the “unjust enemy” becomes not abstract but all-too-concrete in the “terrifying realism” of Goya’s engravings, as well as in the photos of abused and tortured detainees from the Abu Ghraib prison, both of which mutely speak the truth of sovereignty. It seems to us virtually undecidable whether one is correct and the other false, as they describe different aspects of contemporary geo-power. More productive is the attempt to produce a mapping capable of demonstrating the lines of force, which might accord the necropolitical a greater role in the legitimation of sovereign power as such, while the biopolitical approach allows for a greater grasp of the mechanisms of control that this legitimation allows the state (or post-state agencies or assemblages) to develop and refine.

Stuart J. Murray’s article also develops from Mbembe’s work, proposing a concept of *thanatopolitics* that cannot help but recall Mbembe’s theses regarding necropolitics. Murray, however, concedes more to Foucault’s diagnosis of contemporary politics as primarily directed toward the control of populations than does Mbembe. While Mbembe locates necropolitics primarily on the side of power and the state (a move which Baucom furthers), Murray uses the term thanatopolitics to refer to an oppositional politics that uses death as a means of resistance to the biopolitical as such. To discuss what this might mean, Murray focuses on the rhetorical significance of the suicide bomber (whom Hardt and Negri declare to be “the ontological limit of biopower in its most tragic and revolting form”), asking what productive rather than simply destructive effects emerge from the suicide bomber’s symbolic assault (which accompanies but is not reducible to his or her physical assault) on the contemporary political discourse of life. This is perhaps a limit case of Gilles Deleuze’s articulation of ethics in *The Logic of Sense*: “Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us,” to “will death” as an (indeed the) event (and as such not the occurrence of death but the “purely expressed” within what occurs). Murray insists (as does Mbembe) that
this refocusing of the debate on contemporary politics must call into question the
dualism of life and death, rather than simply insisting on the recognition of the
importance of the “marked” pole (death as somehow “more important” than life, or
vice versa). For Murray, this involves the difficult task of imagining a society and a
selfhood in which death is interlaced with life, occasioning a deliberately improper
relation to self and to rational sovereignty. It is in this sense that Murray believes
that we can learn from the discomfort and confusion that the suicide bomber, as
someone who has rejected our own self-serving rational calculation and valuation
of life as such, occasions.

Beyond the threshold of the body marked for death, whether in the very real
figure of the suicide bomber or in the more literary accounts addressed in these
pages, the increasingly nuanced inscriptions deployed by narrative structures—and
the temporalities for which they account—enact a complex politics of life that is
experienced in both subtle and transparent forms every day, in habit and in thought.
The existence and nature of biopolitics is currently an object of debate across such
fields as philosophy, political science, cultural studies, and anthropology; as such,
we do not expect that a single journal issue will decide the fate of the concept, nor
even provide a definite answer as to the best theorization of what biopolitics might
be or mean. Our aim is more modest: that the encounter of biopolitical theory with
considerations of narrative and temporality might bring the role of the imagination
and of cultural mediation into these debates, in the hopes that the sparks thrown
off by such a forced collision might prove instructive across the borders of different
fields. It is not our role to determine how successful this experiment has been. An
introduction is only another narrative, providing a frame for, in this case, a series of
articles that cross this frame transversally rather than resting stably within it. Nor
would we wish for it to be otherwise. A thoroughly planned encounter occasions no
friction, which is what animates the sparks. ■

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1 The most significant thinker in recent years to make the link between narrative and tem-
poral schemata is Paul Ricoeur, to whom this formulation owes a significant debt. See
Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer

2 This formulation is meant to recall Michel de Certeau’s work on everyday life. While
we use the term everyday here relatively uncritically, we also wish to point out that the
everyday, as it has variously been described by thinkers such as Heidegger, Lefebvre, and
de Certeau, is itself a (historically specific) temporal category, based on a notion of a
particular form of repetition. This is obvious in the writings of Heidegger and Lefebvre,
but even de Certeau’s formulation of a “practice” as a “way of operating” assumes a repeti-
tive temporal framework, although this repetition is certainly evaluated differently by de
Certeau than it is by Heidegger or Lefebvre. As such, the delimitation of a sphere that we
can call the everyday (as well as evaluations of that sphere based on differing normative
models for what constitutes meaningful activity) is itself a product of narrative-influenced
expectations of different types of temporal being. See Michel de Certeau, *The Practice
of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988);
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For any who have somehow missed the elaborate discussions revolving around “bare life” in the last few years, see Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).


Ibid., 244-7.


Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*.

The possibility of a place for Deleuze’s thought within feminism is an issue too complicated for us to address in this introduction. Those interested in this question may wish to consult Claire Colebrook’s “Introduction” to the volume *Deleuze and Feminist Theory*, ed. Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 1-17. Many of the articles contained in that collection also dwell on this question.

Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies,” 182.


20 Agamben, “Form-of-Life,” 8-12.


23 Ibid., 29.


25 Ibid., 18-19, 30.

26 Ibid., 54. The suicide bomber is also a figure with which Mbembe briefly deals in “Necropolitics” under the rubric of a “logic of martyrdom.” Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 36-39.